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**Libya Political  
& Security  
Report  
{1969-2020}**  
**Sherif Omar**

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# **Libya Political & Security Report {1969-2020}**

This study papers is a review about the Libyan reality on both military and political levels throughout its previous stages, since the outbreak of the Libyan revolution 1969 until 2020

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## 1. Introduction

Libya is a unique model for the states in the modern era, where for decades a country without a constitution or a structured ruling institution and without understandable authority, in addition to the complete absence of political life in it.

There has been no election of any kind in nearly half a century. Political parties was banned. Not even political parties in favor of the ruling regime were established. According to Muammar Gaddafi's philosophy, partisanship is treachery , the political culture in society became so poor,

And creates a country that lacks the slightest elements of legitimacy, and creates a political climate whose most prominent characteristic is chaos, which continued throughout the era of Muammar Gaddafi's rule.

And with the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, Libya emerged as a unique model, once again, for the specificity of the state. Where the people inherited the chaos that plagued the state's institutions , its administrative and political system, the need for administrative and political experiences, a fertile environment for political action, and a popular culture that promoted the values of unity and collective action emerged.

Which is missing for most of the revolution components!!!

The country's historical division between East and West was an important factor in shaping the features of the political scene after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in addition to the factor of arms proliferation, external interventions, the predominance of tribal , regional logic, and the individual interest in political action as a result of the division that the regime reinforced between social components throughout its 42-year rule.

All of these factors were the reason for the country's division over itself and the exacerbation of a state of social and political fragmentation, so the Libyan scene became difficult to read & understand from the follower from outside or even who lived for a short time in Libya due to the large number of actors in it and its lack of a clear political approach, which prompted it to change its loyalties and reposition in different alliances with the beginning of each new stage.



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## 2- Purpose of this Document

This paper aims to review the Libyan reality on the military and political levels throughout its previous stages since the outbreak of the Libyan revolution until the 4 April 2019 attack by Khalifa Haftar's forces on the capital, Tripoli, and the aftermath on the political and security scene, in an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the events by passing through the stations

The main actors and major actors during the past years, and explain the important details in them. The report will also present at its beginning a brief historical review of the Gaddafi rule during the understanding of the composition of his "regime", the fundamental changes that have occurred in the structure of the state, its external relations, the practices of the Gaddafi security system, the development of protest manifestations and the accompanying changes, conditions, and internal and external factors that paved the way for his ouster in the February 17 revolution.

### Report Main points:

- **AL-Qaddafi's Era {1969-2011}**
- **Libyan Revolution 2011**
  
- **Tribalism and legacy of the system**
- **Revolutions Clashes**
  
- **Forming A Government**
- **Two Government in Libya**
  
- **Foreign intervention in Libya**

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### ➤ AL-Qaddafi's Era {1969-2011}

#### ❖ Ending the political life during AL-Qaddafi's era and dismantling the state

Gaddafi began his rule like any other military rule by disrupting the constitution and ending political life in the country, but unlike other Military coup leaders, Gaddafi did not work to strengthen the security and military institutions of the state to govern his control over the country, but rather to dismantle and weaken it by forming parallel entities that do not have an official status nor it falls under the institutions of the state, such as the revolutionary committee movement, and it is more like a private political organization that has unlimited powers and great influence over almost all state agencies and institutions. These committees were not subject to any institution and they were receiving orders from Gaddafi only - outside the scope of institutional work and away from the law and the judiciary



(Gaddafi decided since 1976 and before announcing what he called the rise of the people's authority, Establishing a political vanguard that took the form of "revolutionary committees" that receives its instructions from him alone, as it is accountable to him alone, and reports directly to it and is parallel to the structures of popular power and permeated in all its joints and controls its movement and decisions...

Usually revolutionary committees have the final say in matters ranging from What students should study in schools and universities or who should be chosen for any position in the people's committees by the Basic People's Congresses. They have turned into a "filter" whose mission is to remove all non-revolutionary elements from all positions in the Libyan government) [1].

Gaddafi justified this chaos and the absolute power granted to that committees that the revolution does not end and that the revolutionary entities and leaders have nothing to do with governance but rather work to direct the popular conferences (parliament) and the people's committees (government / executive bodies) because he is not a president of the country but a guide and leader of revolutionary committees. Gaddafi summarizes the tasks of the revolutionary committees in 7 points referred to in 1977 conference

1. Establishing the authority of the people.
2. Rationalization of popular committees (executive bodies).
3. Inciting the masses to practice the revolution.
4. Moving the people's congresses (government).
5. Supervising the escalation of officials (selection of officials).
6. Exercising revolutionary control.
7. Protecting and defending the revolution

{1} Libya's qaddafi: politics of contradiction, University Press Of Florida. 1977, P (58-60).



This organization, formed by Qaddafi himself selecting his men and women through the popular organization in 1970 and the Socialist Union in 1971, had the most important role in dismantling state institutions and forming the new Qaddafi Jamahiriya.

On this, Dirk Vandwell says in his book "Libya since 1969, a Return to the Gaddafi Revolution":

(The revolutionary committees were armed with the legitimacy of the revolution and they dominated the decision-making process in almost all state institutions - with the exception of the oil sector and the military - and since 1979 the revolutionary committees have dominated On political life, and its primary mission has become to protect the system, and this has contributed directly to the affiliation of the committees to the Gaddafi office and to being made up of loyal followers of the Gaddafi doctrine .. {2}

In 2002 ,the number of revolutionary committee elements is estimated at sixty thousand elements. The revolutionary is well-armed and trained, and they have demonstrated their competence in their response to the 1984 coup carried out by the National Salvation Front. 1980 to 1986) [3].

Since 1977, revolutionary committees have played a fundamental role in separating formal and informal power in Libya. It was used as a tool to strike at any group that threatens the regime, including the army, and the task of dismantling was not limited to the administrative entities of the state but rather expanded to include every side that does not secure Gaddafi as its side, such as newspapers, labor unions, student unions, and private institutions, as Gaddafi believed that the revolution should be All-encompassing, it is a revolution against all previous ideas, institutions and lifestyle.

From this standpoint, Gadhafi began a process of political / social / economic restructuring - according to a theory he called 'the third theory' [4] – { by means that varied between liquidation, arrest, confiscation of property at times, speeches, and conferences - which replaced the laws - and the formation of revolutionary entities that established the mass system at another time.}

After Gaddafi launched what he called the popular revolution in 1973, revolutionary committees attacked universities, institutes, unions, radio , the rest of the media institutions. Libraries and real estate offices also raided ,burned books and real estate documents, which was tantamount to declaring the beginning of the era of chaos and disintegration that spanned nearly four decades.

By the mid-1980s, Gaddafi had repealed the constitution, criminalized parties and political action, dismantled the army and the judiciary, repealed laws, nationalized corporations, released the hands of revolutionary committees in physical liquidation operations inside and outside the country, and stripped more than 80,000 families of their property [5].

The trade unions and student unions were dismantled, and the collective penal code was enacted that required the punishment of the families and relatives of the opponents, extending the scope of the enemies of the "revolution" to include even those who had no political activity, and the country was in complete disarray.

Gaddafi did not maintain any margin of rights and took radical measures that extended to anyone who did not believe in his theories and his green book. By these means, Qadhafi created a state and society that is in line with his vision and tightened his grip on the country by planting revolutionary committees - which he likened to the angels of business writing and companions - everywhere and its authority over all state agencies and institutions. And until the reader appreciates the size of the chaos and understands the psychological state of Gaddafi's political and security climate surrounding the country at the time, we will review parts of his speeches during that period.

{2}dirk Vandewalle, Libya since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited, 2008, Palgrave Macmillan, p(67,68).

{3} On the third world theory see: Muammar Gaddafi, The Green Book, International Center for Research and Studies on the Green Book, 1975



**In his speech to the students on April 7, 1976 , he said { I want a cultural revolution to wash the dirt inside your brains, and if the enemy of the revolution will lead the students, then you are all a flock of sheep. I read some bulletins written by some ignorant students from the university, and the time has come to cut off their hands and then their necks ... What is happening now is the formation of "revolutionary committees" in all colleges, which liquidates the student base and the teaching staff .. If students want it in peace, otherwise let it be by blood everywhere .. Revolutionary committees must be formed everywhere and its mission is to purify both the student base and the teaching staff.**



**In his speech to the students on February 7, 1978 he said { The revolutionary committees are not administrative committees, or popular committees as it is known by this name, but they are revolutionary committees, which do not issue decisions, do not isolate, do not imprison and release , they do not be held accountable, but their duty is to monitor revolutionary control, and do not prosecute anyone, the revolutionary committees evaluate Revolution and leading the masses in the direction of asserting authority .. It is the revolutionary committees that will supervise the re-selection of leaders of the People's Congresses throughout the Jamahiriya. Revolutionary committees everywhere in the Jamahiriya {LIBYA } must mobilize all their forces and be at the level of this great revolutionary mission.}**



**In his speech to the students on April 9, 1979 he said { What is required is to crush the revolution's enemies inside and outside. Whoever wants to challenge the revolution from the inside, this is a foregone conclusion, and we will attack there position even if it is a mosque. If he is abroad, we must move to him abroad and execute the death sentence. You revolutionary committees must implement this ruling, even if it is in the North or South Pole .. We sometimes execute the innocent with the intention of terrorizing the real culprit who may not be known at that time}**



## ❖ The popular protests against Gaddafi

Protests against Qaddafi's policies and theories began from the early years, and they took various forms in stages. Popular protests and opposition protests were peaceful until 1980, and violence in the 1970s was limited to the practices of the regime with opponents in its spectrum,

Since Qaddafi has fought the student movement and launched a campaign against the Islamists in their spectra, which he started to hand over members of the Muslim Brotherhood to Nasser's regime in Egypt immediately after its coup and culminated in Following the announcement of the cultural "revolution" in 1973 [8], none of the spectrum of the opposition was excluded from this campaign, so leaders of the student movement, university professors, members of Islamic groups and communities were arrested, most of the independent personalities affiliated with the Islamic trend were arrested, and thus the state of repression gradually expanded To include a large segment of society, and in light of this climate, a new era of confrontation with the regime began, led by Islamists, individuals and groups.

The opposition's peaceful protest interspersed with "violent" protests from within the regime, which were failed attempts at a coup against Gaddafi, which began with an attempt 'by Defense Minister Lt. Col. Adam Al-Hawaz and Interior Minister Musa Al-Lahsi in which both was executed along with other officers , after which another failed coup attempt was planned.' Abdullah Abed Al-Senussi,' the cousin of the former king in 1970, arrested hundreds of his cousins in Sebha, and the attempt of the Revolutionary Command Council led by 'Omar Muhaishi' in 1975 – which was literally massacred - failed after his extradition by the state of Morocco for 200 million dollars and a million barrels of oil. One million tons of wheat - according to the testimony of a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Abdel Moneim El-Houni El-Houni, and the testimony of Abdel-Rahman Shalgam, Libya's delegate to the United Nations],

as did the attempt by the former chief of staff, Al-Itayush in 1980 followed by the failure of Idris al-Shihabi's coup - a Qadhafi security official in Tobruk in 1980. It is estimated that there were six attempts to overthrow Gaddafi from within the regime, the last of which was an attempt to revolt - unknown details - in Misrata during 1994.

These attempts were a sign of an early protest by most of the military personnel participating in the 1969 coup against Gaddafi's singular power and his anomalous theories and repressive practices that began from the first year after the coup under the direction of Abdel Nasser and Haikal - according to the testimony of two of his comrades Abdel Moneim El-Houni and Awad Hamza - except that they Coup attempts did not gain popular momentum, perhaps because it is from within the system or the nature of security work.

By the early 1980s, most of the opposition turned its spectrum into military and security action, with the exception of some ineffective movements and the Muslim Brotherhood that opted to continuities under-ground opposition approach and intensify their force with Libyan fighting group

Among the most prominent opposition entities at that time was the National Salvation Front, which is the largest and only opposition movement that received international and regional sponsorship, as it was sponsored and assisted by regional and Arab countries such as Sudan, Chad, Morocco, Algeria and Iraq. It also enjoyed international support and encouragement from the United States and Britain and had two operations that targeted the assassination of Gaddafi: a process Bab Al-Azizia 1984 and the 1993 operation in which regime soldiers participated - they were executed - and the two attempts failed due to complaints and information leakage

{8}, Islamic Current in Libya, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 20138. Harun Y. Zilin,



**As for the largest share of confrontation with the regime and attempts to assassinate Gaddafi, it was the Islamists' share, as the 1980s and 1990s witnessed several attempts to assassinate Gaddafi and operations targeting the regime's heads and security posts.**

**The Islamic Fighting Group had the best of luck in that it carried out prominent operations in 1986, 1987 and 1989, after which it was subjected to massive killings and arrests. In 1989, the country witnessed the largest arrest campaign in its history in which the regime arrested more than five thousand Islamists.**

**The group returned to the scene again after six years with an operation targeting the assassination of Gaddafi in Sirte in 1995 and another targeting him in Barak al-Shati in 1996 and another targeting him in Jabal Al-Akhdar in 1998. Attempts to assassinate Gaddafi at the hands of the group reached three, as were other operations by battalions. The martyrs and members of the Islamists are not affiliated with certain groups, such as the assassination of Ahmed Mesbah al-Warfalli - who was considered the right arm of the regime - in Benghazi 1986**

**It can be said that the Islamists, led by the "Islamic Fighting Group," achieved the longest and most dangerous armed clash with the regime, as their operations continued throughout the eighties and nineties throughout Libya, in which these groups showed the ability to continue and emission after receiving painful strikes from the regime represented in the extensive detention campaigns - That affected even the people - the siege operations in which the regime used planes, armored vehicles, heavy weapons, and poisonous gas - as in the 1996 siege of Derna - and the genocide, as happened in the Abu Salim massacre**



### ❖ Foreign relations in the era of Gaddafi

Gaddafi's relationship with surrounding and non-surrounding countries was marked by hostility and volatility. Libya had no stable relations with any country except Iran. Gaddafi cut ties with more than 35 countries, and all the experiences of Arab unity that he launched in the quadripartite, trilateral and bilateral failed formations with Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco, which led to strained relations and severed relations with these countries, and it even came to fighting open conflicts with each other,

As he supported the coup attempts against ex Sudanese president 'Al-Numayri' supported John Garang and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and then played a dual role in the Darfur crisis, sometimes with the support of the parties opposing the ex-Sudanese president 'Al-Bashir' and at times mediating for peace,

He was involved in the Libyan-Chadian war, supporting separatist movements in Africa, Europe, Asia and South America to destabilize the regimes [19] He entered into a conflict with the Saddam Hussein regime, providing the Iranians with long-range missiles during their war against him, and playing a role in the Lebanese civil war.

Gaddafi has also been implicated in failed assassination attempts, including the attempt to assassinate former Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, King Hassan II of Morocco, and attempts to topple former Tunisian Prime Minister El Hadi Nouira.

Gaddafi's adventures were not limited to opposing the regimes and presidents but rather to carrying out bombings and assassinations targeting civilians, so he bombed a café in Berlin in 1986 and bombed the Panam 103 plane in the famous Lockerbie incident in 1988, and blew up a French plane in the skies of Niger in 1980 as it was He had a hand in the 1975 kidnapping of oil ministers in Vienna.

The Gaddafi regime continued its external isolation until the end of the nineties when it began to seek to improve relations with the West in general and the United States in particular through financial settlements and political concessions in many issues, the most important of which is the oil and weapons issue. He agreed to pay compensation to the victims of the Lockerbie incident, surrender those accused of the incident to international trial, as well as compensation for the bombing of the French plane and the bombing of the café in Berlin and the killing of a British policewoman and sought to cooperate with the United States in the fight against terrorism, open the country to Western companies, and dismantle its nuclear program, He handed over chemical weapons, directed armament deals towards the West, strengthened intelligence cooperation with Britain, and supported Sarkozy and Berlusconi in their election campaigns.



❖ **The era of reforms by Gadhafi's son{ Saif al-Islam}**



The regime's foreign policy changes have been accompanied by the emergence of the role of Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam in the political scene, and his finger print clearly emerging on the regime's internal policies, which were:

1. Create two newspapers critical of the country's conditions and authorize writers to work on them.
2. Reconciliation with the "Muslim Brotherhood" and release them from detention facilities.
3. Release a number of prisoners of the Fighting Islamic Group and issuing doctrinal reviews from the group's leaders .
4. Compensating citizens with their confiscated property and livelihood by a decision of Gaddafi in 1978.
5. Compensate detainees who have been held in prison for years without conviction.
6. Compensating the people of the Abu Salim massacre dead.
7. Replace the families of children who have had blood infected with HIV .
8. Opening the way to demonstrate and demand rights.
9. Opening the door for the opposition abroad to return and integrate them into the Libya of Tomorrow project .

With these and other methods, the regime was able to neutralize a wide section of the opposition, and to alleviate the state of popular tension that had not been cleared until it exploded on February 17, 2006 in the form of violent demonstrations in the city of Benghazi, which lasted for several days, killing 11 people and hundreds of wounded. After that, the regime worked to contain the demonstrators by compensating the families of the dead and treating some of the wounded abroad. The General Security Secretary, Nasr Mabrouk, and the Minister of the Interior, Brigadier Saleh Rajab Al-Mesmari, were fired and an investigation was opened with them.

These steps (containing popular anger by holding officials accountable, material compensation, and condoning chants calling for the toppling of Gaddafi - which was previously considered a crime that reaches the penalty of liquidation or life -) are considered an expression of the change in the policies of the Gaddafi regime in dealing with protests with The beginning of the new millennium and the emergence of his son Saif Al-Islam in the political scene and the appearance of his imprint on the policies of the regime



### ❖ The missing part in Early days of Libyan revolution {2011}

The regime's "reforms" did not succeed in tackling the root problems left by the accumulations of four decades of grievances, corruption and chaos, and the Libyan revolution started since late January, when calls appeared on the communication sites calling to take to the streets and demonstrate, and soon culminated in peaceful demonstrations in which a number of jurists and lawyers participated.

On February 14, 2011, however, it developed into an unequal confrontation between demonstrators and the Gadhafi Security Brigades after the latter arrested and beat a number of activists and lawyers assigned to the Abu Salim massacre case. Although the protests began on the 14th and the first numbers of people were killed on the 15th, the electronic campaigns calling for the uprising and revolution had set February 17 as the day of the revolution to mark the memory of the last violent confrontation that the people of Benghazi fought with the security forces on February 17, 2006, where the symbolism of those events that stuck in the memory of the Libyan street, a springboard and gathered for the crowd to revolt.

Gaddafi Brigades committed a heinous massacre in front of the walls of the Fadhil Bawmar Battalion - the most important and largest stronghold of the security system in Benghazi - as they targeted demonstrators with anti-aircraft guns of 12.5, 14.5 and 23 mm and also targeted funerals and demonstrators in other areas with live bullets, causing more than 150 deaths Dead during the first days of the revolution.

Events developed and gatherings of demonstrators were concentrated in front of the battalion's headquarters, and the revolutionaries managed to storm the office of Abdel Fattah Younis - the Minister of Interior and commander of the Thunderbolts - and demanded that he announce his defection, which caused a state of network of security and military forces in Benghazi. In parallel, the revolutionaries managed to storm the battalion camp on February 20, 2011, which was tantamount to declaring the liberation of the eastern region.

The fall of the battalion on February 20 was a milestone in the march of the revolution, so Abd al-Fattah Yunus went out the next day to announce his defection from the regime, which prompted other officials throughout the stages of the first revolution of defection, such as Abd al-Rahman Shalqam - Libya's delegate to the United Nations - and Abd al-Rahman al-Abbar - the Attorney General - And Soliman Mahmoud, commander of the military zone in Tobruk and other officials inside and outside the country. The thunderbolt forces also announced their bias to the demands of the street and sought to evacuate the camp of al-Fadhil Abu Omar battalion and the regime officials inside it without a fight, and succeeded in removing them from the city through the airport.

In light of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in the east between a fugitive and a defector, huge arms and armory depots inside the battalions and camps turned into sources of armaments for the revolutionaries, which marked the beginning of the second stage of the revolution. Coinciding with the uprising in the Libyan East, the cities of the western region, such as Misurata, Zawiya, Zintan, and the cities of the Western Mountain and Tripoli, moved from the early days, but the regime's grip in the west was stronger, and it succeeded in suppressing protests in most of these cities during the early days, and the hit-and-run battles continued until most of these fell. The cities were besieged and bombed in succession, which placed the burden of the biggest battle on the city of Misurata, in which the clashes did not witness a break since the beginning of the events.



### ❖ The second Stage of the revolution { Military confrontation and international intervention }

The revolution moved to the second stage, and the eastern revolutionaries took up arms, began to mobilize and prepare in the regime's camps to proceed towards Ajdabiya, Brega and Ras Lanuf (the cities of the oil crescent). They succeeded in liberating these cities, but they soon fell victim to military ambushes. They captured and killed a large number of them and retreated to Benghazi. The hit-and-run battles continued until March 16, 2011, when the regime forces launched a violent attack on several fronts east and west, and the attack continued for several days in which the regime regained control of several cities such as Ajdabiya, Brega in the east, Nalut and Kiklah in the west, but the regime was unable to control cities such as Misrata and Zintan

### ❖ The Third Stage of the Libyan Revolution

March 19, 2011 marked the beginning of the third stage of the revolution's life, as it witnessed violent and bloody confrontations with the regime forces in the east and west of the country, and then the second half, starting at 6:00 pm, witnessed the launch of the "Dawn of Odessa" or the "united protector" of NATO under Resolution 1973.

The Security Council, which was mainly implemented by France, Britain, and the United States, this was the beginning of foreign intervention that turned the military scales in favor of the revolutionaries. The coalition strikes continued from the French, American and British aircraft and battleships, but France was the most active and enthusiastic, while Europe and the United States refrained from military intervention, France strongly pushed this option, and it succeeded in passing the decision with British / American support - later - as it was the first to recognize the council Transitional as the sole legitimate representative of Libya.

France was proactive in sending its delegations to the country, and did not hesitate - at an advanced stage of the life of the revolution - to go beyond the limits of the mandate of the Odessa dawn operation to transfer the task from protecting civilians and imposing an air embargo to "overthrow the regime" by intensifying air and sea strikes on the camps of Gaddafi forces, and sending experts And military advisers to support the revolutionaries . Gaddafi forces incurred great losses and were forced to retreat following the coalition strikes, and despite the weakening and retreating of Gaddafi forces, the coalition strikes on the Eastern Front witnessed a stalemate for a period of time, and this stalemate followed the emergence of differences between members of the coalition to the public, so the United States announced the withdrawal of most of its forces from The task was subsequently faced with harsh French criticism, to announce a few days later that it had not completely withdrawn from the mission .

Through the international positions that surrounded the events at the time, it can be seen that the main countries in the coalition did not agree on a unified strategy for this process, and at a later stage it became clear that the "international community" did not aim initially to topple the regime but rather to militarily weaken it and press it through sanctions to find a "compromise" . This claim is reinforced by the fact that Western military intervention came more than a month after the outbreak of the revolution, amid the hesitation and reluctance of most countries to act military. The military intervention was preceded by diplomatic endeavors and repeated international and regional demands for Gaddafi to step down from power to reach a compromise.



After the AU meeting with British officials on March 7, 2011, he issued a statement calling for a peaceful solution on March 11, 2011, and the Arab League also called on the next day to find a "solution Center". This was confirmed by the head of the European Union's foreign affairs on March 13, 2011 after his meeting with the Arab League in Cairo [33]. Calls continued from international and regional parties to support this path. It appears that Gadhafi has inspired international parties through communication channels that this is possible, as French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, who acknowledged that the Qaddafi government envoys have been in contact with several members of NATO, stated that a "soon solution is beginning to take shape" [34]. Given France's enthusiastic stance on military intervention compared to other countries, these statements were a clear expression of the absence of international consensus on the need to overthrow the regime.

The Transitional Council - the representative of the political revolutionaries - did not oppose this path, but it hushed these intentions until the announcement of the United Nations envoy to Libya, Abdul Ilah Al-Khatib, in which he spoke about the intention of the parties in the east and west to search for a political solution to the crisis. Mustafa Abdel Jalil, head of the Transitional Council, later stated that he was hoping for a compromise, as he said in an interview with Al-Majalla newspaper on October 21, 2013: "I was counting that Saif Al-Islam's speech would be balanced. If he had come out to the common people, he could have succeeded his father." He also stated in the same meeting that the United Nations envoy, Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib, offered him reconciliation with the regime, so Abdul Jalil stipulated a ceasefire and Gaddafi removed his forces from Tripoli.

He also stated that he was counting on the officials of the regime to take over the affairs in the eastern region and set an example of Abu Mazda Dorda, former prime minister and external security official in the system, and stressed that if these figures took over, the reconciliation would take place, as he put it.

This confirms the course of events on the ground, as NATO operations experienced a prolonged stalemate, which hampered the advances of the rebels on the Eastern Front. The Eastern Front has been frozen for a long time for unknown reasons. This stalemate was then explained by being part of NATO's gradual strategy, and revolutionary mechanisms were targeted when some tried to advance without coordination with the coalition, and these repeated strikes were classified as wrong NATO strikes.



#### ❖ The beginning of the political representation of the revolutionaries

With the eastern region falling into the hands of the revolutionaries, a political representation emerged, expressing their demands. The establishment of the Transitional National Council was announced on February 28, 2011, after a meeting in the city of Al-Bayda on February 23, 2011 by military and dissident officials, tribal leaders and other local figures who varied between lawyers, businessmen, and activists.

The council consisted mostly of dissident figures from the system, headed by Mustafa Abdel Jalil - former Minister of Justice - and Interior Minister Abdel Fattah Younis, who became a military commander - until he was assassinated on July 28, 2011. The Executive Council was managed by Mahmoud Gabriel - Secretary of the Planning and Development Council –

The Council also included expatriate opponents such as Ali Al-Tarhouni, Mahmoud Shammam, and other figures who are still unknown today. The Council began with thirty members and swelled until it exceeded eighty members, and it kept the secrecy of some of its members for security reasons at the time.

This representation was marred by a lot of ambiguity. This resulted in tension and lack of confidence in the council by the people of some regions and most of the rebel fighters, but the necessity of the stage prompted everyone to overlook their legitimate fears until the liberation takes place. The transitional council succeeded on the external level because of international support, but it lost the revolutionary legitimacy at home because it was crowded with officials from the previous regime and other figures who were classified as "non-revolutionary" in evaluating the Libyan street. There was a clear schizophrenia since the early days between the political representation of the revolution and its military forces on the ground. With the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the setting of mid-2012 as the date for the elections, the processes of political and regional polarization and their effects began to become clear.

#### ❖ The roots of the crisis and the poles of the revolution

The forces of the military revolution have emerged from the battle with the regime more powerful after seizing the huge arsenal of Gaddafi's weapons. The largest quantity of weapons was allocated to the cities of the western region, which received the largest share of fighting against the regime, especially Misurata and Zintan.

The population density and the concentration of a large part of the regime's arsenal in areas adjacent to these cities played a major role in this. In view of the flaccidity of the military and security institutions during the Qaddafi era, these brigades assumed security and militarization tasks as soon as the war ended. Of course, the number of military formations swelled immediately after the end of the war. Formations and figures emerged that did not participate effectively or have never participated in the war, which lasted 8 months. All over the country



This inflation constituted the appropriate cover for the former regime's cronies and areas loyal to them to reproduce themselves and arm their regions and tribes by joining these brigades and forming strong blocs within them. This was facilitated by the fact that these brigades are primarily regional, due to several factors:

1. The country's social structure, as tribal identity plays an important role in Libyan society.
2. The course of events in the revolution. Military formations were established on the basis of defending their cities and regions.
3. Policies pursued by the previous regime to nurture regional and tribal tendency by playing upon the chord of historical conflicts and the contradiction of interests between tribes and regions

#### ❖ Map of the ethnic components of Libya

This trend, in addition to the crimes committed by pro-regime tribes during the revolution, ignited local conflicts between regions, and together with external support it had the most important and greatest role in shaping the alliance map in the coming stages. Although ideological polarization and partisan interests played an important role in shaping the scene as well, it was secondary in the early stages.



As in the case of the security and military establishment, the judiciary was a weak and unreliable institution among the Libyans, which made the process of taking rights with force of arms and returning grievances a prevailing situation. Violence and revenge escalated, most of which came in the form of assassinations of members of the revolutionary committees, former regime soldiers and internal security officers, the most prominent of which was the assassination of former Interior Minister Abdel-Fattah Younis al-Obeidi, which was followed by incidents of violence and revenge, the most prominent of which was the storming by armed men of the Ministry of Interior building to liberate one of the accused of his assassination, as it was followed by A clash between formations of the Benghazi revolutionaries and the al-Obaidat tribe, which threatened to block oil and roads in response to the assassination of Abd al-Fattah al-Ubaidi .

The proliferation of weapons in light of accumulated grievances over decades and the absence of security and judicial institutions led to the production of unstable conditions in the country, and accelerated the clash between the forces of the revolution and the brigades and figures splintering from the regime, especially in the east of the country, which was liberated in a short period and did not have an opportunity to screen its ranks to integrate the



components of the region into Pot of the Revolution.

International recommendations poured into the transitional council the necessity of collecting weapons, dismantling the militia of the revolutionaries, and merging them under the leadership of the “army” [41] before penetrating into the joints of the state and entering the political action line loaded with this huge amount of weapons, but this was impossible for several reasons, including:

1. The lack of confidence of the revolutionaries in their political representation.
2. Tribal and regional competition for leadership and gains - which later turned into armed conflicts and provided cover for other conflicts.
3. Fear of the return of the former regime's comrades in the dress of the revolution at the head of the security and military apparatus.
4. The rebels held fast to the material and political gains they had made, as they were sure they would lose them as soon as they surrendered arms or disbanded their brigades.
5. The revolutionaries maintained their demands to liquidate the army of the highest ranks and the regime's pundits

In light of this atmosphere charged with all these unresolved issues (the return of criminals, regional and tribal rivalries, lack of confidence in political representation, inflation of revolutionary blocs) and in the absence of a judiciary that guarantees rights and restores grievances, the absence of established military and security institutions able to absorb the rebel brigades, and the absence of Any reassurances of the forces on the ground

The battle to attract alliances between the military and political forces began to take shape, especially after the National Congress elections in mid 2012. Two poles appeared in the scene, the pole of the Islamic current and the revolutionary current.

The Misrata Revolutionaries Brigades, Al-Zawiya and most of the Benghazi Revolutionaries were the most prominent party in this alliance. And the Pole of the Marginalized Pact - so to speak - is made up of some liberals and military personnel, and some tribes and cities that have been affected and lost their privileges by the fall of the regime and changing the balance of power after the revolution. This alliance succeeded in attracting the Zintan rebel brigades and forming brigades composed mostly of elements of the previous regime under the cover of the tribe to be its representative on the ground.

The conflict between the two parties began and attempts to exert influence on strategic facilities and sovereign institutions early, especially in the western region where there is the largest concentration of military forces, and where the capital Tripoli, which included important institutions and facilities



## ❖ The Emergence of Political Islam Strongly on the Libyan Scene

Islamists have always been a powerful driver of events in the country, and with the beginning of the revolution they emerged as an important actor on the military and political scene from the early days, and his men played an important role in the military action on the eastern and western fronts. Military figures such as Muhammad al-Madani came from Zintan, Miftah al-Thawadi, Abdel-Moneim al-Madhouni from Sabratha, and Abd Al-Hakim al-Hassadi, Salem Derby from Darnah, Fawzi Bukteef, Abdul-Jawad Al-Badin, Ismail Al-Sallabi and Muhammad Al-Ghurabi from Benghazi, Abdul-Hakim Al-Hajj and Mahdi Al-Harati and Khaled Al-Sharif from Tripoli, Abdul-Wahab Al-Qaid and Ahmed Al-Hasnawi and Gabriel Al-Baba from the south, Muhammad Al-Kilani and Shaaban Hadiya from the corner, and many others from many different The regions of Libya who cannot be mentioned.

All of these were active in resisting the Qaddafi regime. As for the political scene, the prominent representation of the Brotherhood party (the Justice and Construction Party) was 17 seats in the National Congress out of 80 seats allocated to parties and 17 out of 120 seats allocated to independents, and the rest of the Islamic parties such as the National Party and the Party Al-Risala, Al-Asala, Umma, and Reform and Development Party have a total of 27 out of 200, with the largest number of seats in Al-Zawiya, Tripoli, and Benghazi. Despite the small number of seats (61 out of 200), the Islamists had the strongest political presence for several reasons, the most important of which are:

1. Their strong presence in the revolution.
2. Alliance with the most important forces of the revolution.
3. Their members belong to revolutionary regions and cities.
4. They enjoy strong military representation on the ground.
5. The parliamentary bloc of the most prominent political rival (the Alliance of National Forces) floundered.

The strong presence of Islamists on the political and military arenas was not matched by a liberal presence with the same strength. On the political level, the “National Forces Alliance” party led by the liberal Mahmoud Gabriel, which won 64 seats out of a total of 200 liberal parties, was not in the correct sense. The “party” was an alliance comprising a group of Popular local figures, businessmen, and former regime men such as :

1. Libya's former ambassador to Italy, Hafez Kaddour - who remained loyal to the regime until late in the revolution and described himself in a leaked call with Al-Senussi as loyal to the regime.
2. Abdul Rahman Shalqam, who held several positions in the Qaddafi era, ending with his appointment as Libyan delegate to the United Nations.
3. Businessman Abdul Majeed Mulaqita from Zintan who had a relationship with the regime before establishing the Qaqaa Brigade in the revolution, and had channels of communication with the Emirates at an early stage.
4. The UAE-based businessman Ismail Shtaiwi, who later supplied Hifter with Emirati armor in the Benghazi war.



5. **Businessman Jumaa Al-Osta** - a former member of the revolutionary committees - the owner of the capital channel. The party also supported the famous businessman **Hassan Tatnaki**, owner of the **Libya Channel** first - who is known for his hostility to the Islamists. The bottom line is that the coalition was not a liberal party as much as it was a bloc representing those affected by the post-revolutionary conditions, especially after the National Congress passed the Law of Political Isolation, which requires preventing anyone who worked with the regime from assuming any position in state agencies - a law imposed by the revolutionaries by force of arms. The parliament was surrounded for 12 hours –

which led to the intensification of the conflict, as a result of which it completely excluded most of the members of the coalition and some members of the National Congress who represented southern regions and other areas such as **Bani Walid**.

On the military front, there were no anti-Islamist forces with a liberal orientation, but some splinter forces from the regime and battalions formed after the revolution represented the "defeated" cities and tribes such as (**Bani Walid**, **Tarhuna**, **Sirte**, **Sabha**, **Ghadames**, and **Siphon**) that had allied with the **Zintan Brigades** ( **Al-Qaqa**, **Thunderbolts**) - which are the military wing of the **National Forces Alliance** - such as the **Brigade of the Faithful** in **Tarhuna**, the **138 infantry battalion** in **Rikdal**, the remnants of the regime brigades in **Bani Walid**, and the **al-Sa`qa Brigade** in **Benghazi** that the Islamists have hostility - being the force on which **Qadhafi** relied, led by **Abd al-Fattah Yunis**, launched a fierce crackdown on Islamists in the east of the country in the late 1990s

The alliance between the revolutionaries and the Islamists dominated the security and military scenes, so they were at the head of the **Supreme Security Committee**, which took over the functions of the security services and succeeded in forming major military blocs and alliances that replaced the army, led by the **Libya Shield** forces, which came under the leadership of the staff led by **Youssef Al-Manqoush** and included most of the revolutionary brigades. The Great, as they formed the **Supreme Council of the Libyan Revolutionaries** led by **Wissam bin Hamid** - the military leader of the **Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council** later - and the **Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room** - which had the most prominent role in imposing the political isolation law - as they were at the head of most military councils, and they managed to dominate protection units **Borders**, and established the **National Guard**, which took on many tasks, including arresting and interrogating the pillars of the former regime. Despite the presence of this strong alliance, but it did not monopolize the security sector and militarization, the "marginalized" alliance that succeeded in attracting some revolutionary formations had a prominent presence in important cities and sites such as: **Tripoli**, **Benghazi**, and the **Hilal oil region**. Most of the components of this alliance fell under the **Ministry of Defense** led by **Osama Al-Jueli** from **Zintan** - the commander of the western military region now - and the **Zintan Brigades** were keen to control oil installations in the western region.

When talking about Islamists, the jihadist trend cannot be ignored. Although it constituted the lowest percentage within the Islamic and revolutionary spectrum, but it was no less important than the rest of the currents in influencing the course of events, it had a prominent role in fighting against the regime before and during the revolution, as it had the most prominent role in confronting the forces of **Khalifa Hifter** and the alliance of the forces of the "counter-revolution" In 2014.



Contrary to all the components of the revolution, the movement did not have a role in the struggle for political influence, and it appeared on the scene through civil activities: such as charitable work and the conduct of relief convoys - inside and outside the country - and the provision of some health and financial services such as providing aid to the needy, establishing free clinics, and providing facilities Hygienic, such as Al-Jalaa Hospital in Benghazi. He was also active in advocacy conferences, organizing demonstrations, printing leaflets and books in an attempt to communicate his message and improve his image through these means.

Although the Libyan jihadist movement isolated itself from the post-revolutionary clashes and did not participate in the formation of the state's security services and conflicts of influence over institutions, it was the first - medialy - accused of assassinations that targeted soldiers from the former regime, and it raised the current concern in collecting and smuggling weapons Across the borders of neighboring countries, the preparation of training camps and the organization of scientific courses to attract new elements, Western concern was reflected in the position of some local parties

The official representation of the jihadi movement was limited to the Ansar al-Sharia group that was founded in Benghazi in mid-2012 after most of its founders split from the Rafah al-Sahati battalion - the largest Islamic military formation in the country. The group supervised most of the activities mentioned above, and other jihadi groups outside it did not have a major role. The group succeeded in attracting many members of these gatherings because of its system and ability to organize activities such as charitable work, public seminars, scientific courses and, most importantly, weapons training camps.

The local anxiety of the current has grown, especially after the emergence of the Ansar al-Sharia group in several important areas such as Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Sabratha and its establishment of a military wing and the publication of leaflets branding democracy in disbelief and prohibiting the electoral process in the absence of Islamic law and its demolition of Sufi shrines and the emergence of anti-American rhetoric and criticizing its policies towards the world Islamic. The attacks on the American consulate and other locations of the CIA on September 11, 2011, erupted the growing western and local concern of the Libyan jihadist movement. Although the official representative of the movement - Ansar al-Sharia group - denied that it was formally involved in the attack, accusations were made against it. The official statement of the group carried great ambiguity, and its anti-American rhetoric reinforced these accusations, accompanied by evidence of the participation of individuals affiliated with it in the attack, which led to the emergence of Libyan jihadist movement and its official representative as an international threat .

Ansar al-Sharia remained the sole representative of the jihad movement until ISIS emerged in late 2014, and it succeeded in attracting many prominent figures affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia, and several factors contributed to this, most notably:

1. The state's failure to antagonize the Ansar al-Sharia group in the early stages of obtaining support from it.
2. Promote the concept of "brotherhood of the curriculum" among the group, which opened the door for the organization to freely promote its views within the group.



3. The organization calls on some followers not to announce their sale and to adhere to their positions within other groups. The most prominent example was the official of the Sharia Committee in Ansar al-Sharia Abu Abdullah Muhammad al-Tarhouni .

The organization succeeded in establishing bases for it in Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Sabratha, and later managed to replace Ansar al-Sharia in Sirte to uniquely manage the city and become its largest stronghold while failing in Derna after the Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Derna was able to overcome it in 2016 and continued to maintain its presence in Benghazi until He withdrew from it to Sirte in 2017.

The success of the Islamists in the rise and spread - during the period 2011-2014 - and the formation of deep and solid alliances with the revolutionary trend were a source of concern for local and international parties, and this was clearly demonstrated in the leaks of correspondence of the United Nations envoy Bernardino Leon to the UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed,

which we will mention later. Despite their success in dominating the political and security scenes, they failed at the media level in the face of the discourse directed against them, and failed at the social level to attract tribal components and prevent them from aligning with the camp of the “counter-revolution” - a complex file due to its association with the legacy of the regime and the relationship of many tribal figures with it Despite the efforts made by some independent Islamic personalities in this file, the state of polarization, the role of the media, and external parties have had the greatest impact on shaping the alliance map.

The assassinations that targeted personalities seeking in this file also had an important role in thwarting these efforts, the most prominent of which was the assassination of Sheikh “Mansour al-Barasi” on May 16, 2014 by “unidentified” gunmen in the city of Benghazi.



## Tribalism and legacy of the

### system

The tribe entity played an important role in building the structure of the Libyan state and formulating its features, so the tribe had the most important role in formulating political positions from the Italian invasion of the country and represented the pot of resistance in the western region while the Senussi movement had the most prominent role in formulating political positions and leading the resistance in the eastern region, and then became this Tribes are part of the political system during the reign of the Kingdom after independence, so power and roles were shared on the basis of tribal quotas, and Senate seats were distributed at that time, regardless of competence and ability to exercise the role assigned to them. This period did not define a negative or exploitative exploitation of the tribes, as the state took into account tribal demands and sensitivities between regions and tribes, but this changed with the 1969 coup.



Attempts at the coup against him, so he was keen to restore the tribe's role to the scene by strengthening his tribe and his cousins by forming alliances with tribes such as al-Magarha, al-Warfallah and the children of Suleiman, and he was able to include members of Arab tribes from Egypt and Mauritania for his tribe and their homeland in its regions [48]. On the other hand, Gaddafi played on the contradictions and conflicts between other tribes such as the Moroccans, Zawwat, Tabu, Zawiya, Bani Walid, Misrata and other historical conflicts, and he employed these conflicts as a tool of governance. The successor of Ilnich Gaddafi was the army officer responsible for the tribes file and then took over the management of the file Omar Shakal Gaddafi.

Gaddafi surrounded himself with a belt of tribes that were classified as first-class tribes and received economic privileges (state budgets, lands, smuggling routes management), and the other tribes did not. Consequently, a social system was formed, and these tribes were at the head, and rapprochement with the influential personalities became a means to obtain privileges and rapprochement with the system.

But this does not mean that Gaddafi excluded other tribes from important positions, so each tribe - even minorities - had officials and large security figures representing the tribe's window on the system, so it was among the slaves Abdul Fattah Younis, Suleiman Mahmoud and Mubarak Ateeq, and from Aqwari al-Sanusari al-Wazir and Abdul Rahman al-Abbar, and from the Moroccans Mubarak Al-Shamekh, and from Al-Warfalla, Imran Boukraa ', and from Al-Zwi Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Zwi and Abd Al-Rahman Al-Seid. Gaddafi incited the people to claim his rights through the tribes and their representatives - who were chosen by Gaddafi - in the system and thus within the loyalty of these personalities, which he gained influence over the tribes, and within the tribe subject to these personalities and provide loyalty to them, which transformed the tribe's role to a security role in the first place.



## ❖ Non-Arab minorities



As for the non-Arab minorities, such as the Tuareg and the Tabu, Gaddafi employed them as a military and political card. He formed Tuaregs as military units in exchange for granting them Libyan citizenship, and brought them from Mali and Niger and included them to special military units that fought outside the country in Lebanon and Mali. He also used the Tabu as a pressure card to pressure Chad and Niger and kept them away from important positions. Most of the components of these tribes remained marginalized, and the nationality was withdrawn from the Tabu in the nineties and then in 2008 and they were deprived of education, health and appointment services in state jobs. . As for the Berbers, they had a plentiful share of marginalization in light of the wave of Arabism and nationalism. Gaddafi described - in a speech in 1997 - the defense of the Berbers as a "colonial conspiracy" .

## ❖ Tribal interests

The interests of the tribe were linked throughout the Qaddafi era with the influential figures in his regime, and with the collapse of the regime in the revolution, the tribe found itself on the sidelines. Tobruk Parliament - on February 14, 2011 in pledge allegiance to the Gaddafi regime .

These factors (the association of the tribe's interests with the regime, the absence of a collective position on the revolution, the bias of some prominent figures of the regime, and the launch of the revolution from the cities of Benghazi and Derna) have lost the tribal component in the east in its role in mobilizing the street and leading the battle throughout the life of the revolution.

## ❖ Tribal map of Libya

The state of the revolution exceeded the tribal slogans and tendencies and with the fall of the entire eastern region within a short period - five days - and the domination of the revolutionaries over them all the tribal voices loyal to the regime disappeared, which allowed the inclusion of all components of the tribal eastern region under the cover of the revolution, which did not happen in the western region where the fighting continued until the killing of Gaddafi This led to the emergence of tribal parties and areas of Walt regime, and they fought with him as Corvela, Rashfana, Tawergha, Tarhuna, Sirte, Rikdalin and other regions and tribes, while other parties fought the regime such as Misurata, Zawiya, Jabal Al Nafusa and



Kiklah, and Zintan,

which had the greatest impact in sparking conflicts Between these parties after the end of the revolution, while the eastern region did not witness conflicts between tribes and regions, but the conflict took on another form because of the fusion of tribes and characters loyal to the regime in the crucible of the revolution.

The revolutionary climate prevailed in the eastern region, and the tribal tendency in the military conflict only employed later in Operation Dignity - whereby the hatred of the eastern



tribes exploited the revolutionaries of western origin to mobilize the tribal forces to fight them - while the conflict with the regime loyalists in the western region took on a tribal, regional character in an early stage. This contributed to shaping the map of political and military alliances, which in turn reflected on the eastern region, so the eastern revolutionary brigades aligned with the revolutionary components in the western region, which pushed the components of the eastern region tribes that the revolution overcame to close its alliance with the counter-revolution movement

#### ❖ Demanding a federal state and autonomy

In light of the emergence of these alliances, another stream emerged outside the context of the ongoing revolutionary conflict, a stream that has its own demands and agenda that have not received attention from any of the components of the arena - even from its allies - and that is the federal current that appeared with official representation for the first time in March 2012 in a conference announced It included the formation of the Barqa Constituent Assembly and the Barqa Army led by Hamid Al-Hassi - a former colonel in the army - in which the movement demanded self-rule and boycotting the elections and its supporters later staged sit-in in the oil ports, closed the roads leading to the west of the country, attacked some polling stations in Benghazi, and attacked a helicopter carrying special materials Elections with machine guns to protest against the distribution of seats in the General National Congress .

#### ❖ Map of Libyan provinces



Although the eastern region won sixty seats in the National Congress (parliament) and obtained a sovereign ministry (defense) and 6 ministerial portfolios in the Zidan government (health, housing, social affairs, culture, agriculture) as the position of vice president was allocated to the region and the division of seats was modified The Constitution Drafting Committee reaches 20 seats for each region in response to the eastern demands, but the current protests escalated until they reached the stage of closing oil ports in 2013, which lasted for nearly three years in which the state treasury incurred losses estimated at \$ 125 billion. The Facilities Guard Service, led by Ibrahim Al-Jadran, also blackmailed the National Conference and demanded more than \$ 300 million in dues for the agency .

It is worth noting that the oil closures were not limited to the east, as the Zintan battalions closed the oil facilities several times to put pressure on the national conference, and the closings encouraged the media of the "counter-revolution" to announce their opponents who were at the forefront of the government. The closures have had catastrophic results for the country's economy, in addition to the \$ 125 billion dollars, the closure of the Zintan brigades cost the oil fields \$ 25 billion

The role of the federal current since its appearance was limited to "jamming" and played a role in destabilizing more than other currents. The closure of oil ports caused an economic crisis that exhausted the monetary reserve, which declined from \$ 120 billion in 2012 to \$ 70 billion in 2016 , which caused a decrease Great value in the Libyan currency against the dollar. Despite the loud voice of the trend, it was not very popular for several reasons, including:

1. The composition of the cities of Benghazi and Derna population, where a large percentage of its population is traced back to the Libyan West - the current is dominated by the racist tribal element.
2. The absence of strong internal and external parties supporting the demands of the current.
3. The tyranny of the tribal character dominating the current and its racism and regionalism - a tendency used to mobilize supporters of the current during the fighting in 2014.
4. The vandalism carried out by the movement in the early stages, and it continued to escalate, and caused huge financial losses.



The federal trend failed to achieve any of its demands after the outbreak of the conflict in 2014 and its joining the "counter-revolution" coalition because of its lack of independence and leadership, and the control of Khalifa Haftar and his regional allies on the political decision of this alliance.

### ❖ Tribalism and political life

There is no doubt that regional tribalism played a large role in shaping the features of the political scene in the post-revolution period, but this role was dominated by the nature of employment. In all political struggles, the tribe was not an independent political actor, but rather an object of it. This is evident in the tribe's loss - represented by its elders and the influential figures in it - of its own political stance or the expression of its independent political vision for any of the important and pivotal issues in the ongoing conflict. Rather, the tribe's "stance" is in support of this or that party affected by the attainable interests and spoils. It is not without the presence of prominent personalities affiliated with these tribes who have independent political positions, but when it comes to the official representation of the tribe, independent political positions are completely absent.

Accordingly, the tribe is an important and active element in the conflict, but it is not a trigger for events. This is clearly evident in the political weakness of the federal current, although it possesses all the pressure and military strength necessary to effect change, but its role did not exceed "sabotage" in its early stages 2012-2013 and employment by the "counter-revolution" after this. The movement is currently fighting a war in Tripoli under the leadership of Khalifa Hifter, who is opposed by most of his supporters.

Evidence of the lack of will and political identity in the tribe is many, and perhaps this is one of the legacies of the previous regime, as it was keen to absent the tribe's role as a social entity except in the context of serving the system and linking the position of the tribes with their representatives in it, and this stripped the tribe of its position and its role as an independent entity. The role of most of the tribes after the revolution came similar to what it was before, with slight differences due to the proliferation of weapons, which strengthened the tribe's ability to bargain power over specific gains and gains. Consequently, it summarizes the tribe's role in searching for the spoil and competing with the tribes that are over it, regardless of the political consequences.



### ❖ The clash between revolution and counter-revolution

Compared to the Arab Spring countries, Libya is the most complex when it comes to understanding the map of alliances and their components. This is due to the large number of social, military and political actors. But the state of polarization, which has been evident day after day, has fused these elements in two camps. Camp victors after the revolution and the camp of the defeated or the revolution and counter-revolution. This summary is disgraceful when it comes to an accurate reading of the nature of the components and objectives of these alliances, but it gives a general understanding of the course of events and ongoing conflicts.

The most important factors that shaped the counter-revolution coalition were:

1. Political isolation law.
2. The domination of the military and security scenes by the revolutionaries and the Islamists.
3. The revolutionaries crossed the tribe's entity and linked its interests to elements of the previous regime.
4. Gulf Finance and International Support.
5. Tribal regional competition.
6. Regionalism in the East - which was a key driver for the tribal forces to join the Anti-Revolution Alliance to expel the revolutionaries of western origin.

These factors constituted a meeting point for interests between the most important elements of the counter-revolution (the alliance of national forces, pro-regime military formations and figures, tribal forces). Because of the weak position of this alliance on the military and political levels, he resorted to confronting the Alliance of the Revolution by other means, and he worked on two axes:

1. Dismantling revolutionary military entities and alliances.
2. Drop the National Convention.

Where the counter-revolution began to rally demonstrations in front of the headquarters of the rebel brigades, demanding that they be dissolved and replaced by "army" forces. Despite the predominance of the civilian character of these demonstrations, they were not free of demonstrators carrying weapons and homemade explosives, which led to exchanges of fire and casualties and deaths in some of them, the most prominent of which were:

\* Demonstrations of June 8, 2013, in front of a headquarters of the Libya Shield Force in Benghazi, in which 32 armed demonstrators were killed and two were killed from the Battalion (Shield 1)

\* The demonstrations of November 15, 2013 in front of the headquarters of the Central Shield in Tripoli, in which 31 people were killed and hundreds wounded, after an exchange of fire between the attackers and the members of the battalion . Nearly weekly demonstrations were mobilized calling for the overthrow of the General National Congress (parliament), and the media was the biggest factor in stirring these demonstrations, as most media channels at the time were speaking on behalf of this alliance - as most of them were owned by businessmen loyal to him .

while he did not meet These means are successful coping policies from the Revolution Alliance, so the fall of this number of deaths had a great impact in fueling the street and resulted in the evacuation of the locations of these battalions in favor of the "army" and the failure of the revolution media to put things in context and confront the accusations that were made against the revolutionaries.



### ❖ Forms of conflict between the two sides of the revolution



The conflict between the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution took many forms. There was the regional conflict between Misurata and Zintan, the Zawiya and Warsfana in the west, the conflict between the federal current and its opponents in the east, and the conflict with the remnants of the regime, and the struggle between the Islamists and their opponents, so these parties aligned with the closest to them in terms of values and interests against its opponents, but the counter-revolution alliance was more efficient in managing the conflict for several reasons,

The most important of which are:

1. Intensity of external support that started in the early stages.
2. The political decision and military influence was concentrated in the hands of one party (Khalifa Haftar with Emirati support).
3. The power of media advertising.
4. Most of the alliance's components meet the necessity of military rule.
5. Uniting military efforts and unanimity on the necessity of a military solution with opponents.

In addition to other causes and factors, many of which were related to the mismanagement of the revolution movement for conflict, misuse of influence, the organization of the revolutionary forces themselves in separate territorial frameworks, the absence of a unified leadership, and the dispersal of the internal rank that reached its climax with the announcement of signing the Skhirat Agreement in the second half of 2015 Sponsored and supervised by the United Nations Mission.

### ❖ The Climax of the conflict

The counterrevolutionary forces failed to overthrow the National Congress and dismantle the rebel brigades, but they prepared public opinion for military action against those components. The move to vacate some of the revolutionary forces' camps in Benghazi and Tripoli created conditions to increase their influence on the ground. The Zintan brigades gained more influence by leaving the Misrata brigades from Tripoli, and the forces loyal to Haftar gained important locations in Benghazi. Hifter's announcement of his reversal of the conference and his freezing of the constitutional declaration came on February 14, 2014 to transfer the conflict to the level of an all-out open war.

The announcement of the coup did not follow a serious military move because Haftar failed to mobilize his allies in the west of the country under his command, then he headed to the east, where he managed to mobilize forces to follow his orders and appeared on the screen again to announce the launch of Operation Dignity on May 16, 2014, and this time he succeeded in forming a force of the main strength of the tribes of the East and the splintered army battalions From the regime, the Salafi Inlet movement has emerged as a major component on which Haftar relied on military and security work.

This movement coincided with the attack of the Zintan Brigades (Al-Qaqaa, Al-Qaaqaa, and Al-Madani) on the National Congress on May 18, 2014, when they stormed the place and kidnapped several members of it, and announced the dissolution of the conference. Order and liberal figures - which were part of the Transitional Council



### ❖ Revolutionary Reaction

The fastest revolutionary reaction came from Benghazi, where the Islamist revolutionary brigades united with each other and united with Ansar al-Sharia to form an alliance under the name of the “Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council” and it was announced on June 20, 2014, a month after the start of Operation Dignity, then a process of coercion or dawn came Libya on July 13, 2014, which was launched by the rebels of the western region to defend the National Congress and expel the Zintan Brigades from Tripoli.

Although the largest component of this alliance is the Misurata Brigades, a large stream inside the city opposed the war option and tried to disrupt the military operations. The most prominent representatives of this trend were: the municipal council of the city headed by Muhammad Shtaiwi - who was subsequently assassinated - and the Salafi “Al-Madkhali” movement led by Abd al-Rahman al-Kut - commander in the battalion of Merdas - and Anwar Souissi - commander of the Yarmouk battalion - and some military figures such as Salem Juha and Marwan al-Haddad And Muhannad al-Mahjoub, a commander in the al-Mahjoub brigade, also announced that the Central Libyan Shield forces affiliated to Misurata, through the spokesperson of the official spokesman, Ahmed Hadiya, announced that they were neutral.

The fighting, after her arrival in Tripoli, she sought to negotiate with the Zintan Brigades to share control of the airport, and later offered to hand him over to an intermediary force, but all these efforts failed. Most of the Tripoli Brigades also refrained from participating in the operation, the most prominent of which was the deterrence force led by the Salafi “Al-Madkhali” Abdul Raouf Karah and the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade led by Haitham Al-Tajouri, but this reluctance and hesitation did not significantly affect the course of the military operations. The revolutionary and Islamic forces succeeded in each of Misurata And Tripoli, Al-Zawiya and Sabratha, in achieving remarkable military progress, and thanks to the momentum of the advances, they managed to draw some of the forces hesitant to the battle, and the most prominent figures who led these efforts: Salah Badi, Salem Al-Zufri, Hamouda Al-Nairiya, Mustafa Al-Mazek, Fathi Pashaga from Misurata, Salah Al-Baraki, Salah Al-Raqi, and Abdel-Ghani Al-Kakli from Tripoli Muhammad al-Kilani, Saheb al-Rammah, Sha`ban Hadiyya, Mahmoud bin Rajab from al-Zawiya and Omar al-Mukhtar al-Madhouni from Sabratha and other figures whose status cannot be mentioned and which had the most important role in launching and leading the dawn of Libya.

As the fighting flared up, the Zintan brigades released the prisoners of the former regime, led by Omar Tantush

on June 15, 2014, a prominent officer in the Gaddafi regime that oversaw the execution of the officers of the 1993 coup attempt, and supporters of the former regime began to return and gather in their areas, until it was announced On the establishment of the “Army of Tribes” in a major tribal conference in early August held in Al-Aziziya, south of Tripoli, and I mean its support for the “Army” forces (Zintan Brigades and the Dignity Alliance), and the Rasfana tribe formed the backbone of this force as one of the largest tribes that support the former regime and became famous Tribes ”later on with his criminal acts, such as harpoon, kidnapping, and identity killing



### ❖ The Libyan Parliament Election

Prior to the outbreak of these events and in light of the deteriorating security conditions, the Libyan Parliament elections were held on May 25, 2014 in light of legal suspicions, so participation in them was very low by 630,000 voters compared to 2,865,000 in the National Congress elections -

for example, Aqeela Saleh was elected with 913 votes. Then came the announcement of the results of these elections on July 22, 2014 in light of an open war east and west of the country. The results did not come in the interest of the revolutionary and Islamic forces, and the parliament was moved to eastern Libya - in the areas of influence of Haftar forces - which prompted many members to boycott the parliament. The first parliament session was held with 158 members out of 188, and the number of attendees continued to decrease until it reached almost half.

Once the parliament moved to the east, its bias towards the Karama camp appeared. On August 15, 2014, the parliament directed a request to the international community to intervene to strike "Dawn Libya Militia" after classifying them as terrorist groups, which was followed by Emirati aircraft strikes on the Dawn Libya forces that were launched from Egyptian bases, killing a number of fighters. A large number of fighters, then Parliament canceled the Political Isolation Law on February 2, 2015, which clearly expressed the mood and tendencies of Parliament. These events were the first of their kind. Despite the intensification of the conflict in earlier stages, the state institutions remained one and the country did not witness interference from external parties. In this way, the abolition of the "political isolation" law gave the counter-revolution alliance the legal cover to return the regime's pawns to the political scene.

On November 6, 2014, the Supreme Court decided to dissolve Parliament [65] after the boycotting deputy and the lawman Abd al-Raouf al-Mannai lodged an appeal against it and accused him of overstepping his duties by requesting foreign interference, but Parliament refused to submit to the ruling of the judiciary. The Patriotic General, which is considered blatant interference and bias for one of the parties to the conflict.

These precedents (bypassing the judiciary, requesting external interference, dividing the state's institutions, biasing the international community to one party over another) constituted a new scene that was not governed by legal and political controls that ruled the scene in past years.



### ❖ Field scene and the Dawn of Libya alliance {Fager's Libya}



On the field level, Fajr Libya forces were able to resolve the battle of Tripoli within a month and a half, so the liberation of Tripoli International Airport was announced and the Zintan Brigades were expelled from Tripoli on August 24, 2014, and meanwhile, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Brigades continued to advance on the Eastern Front until the date of October 15, 2014 when they were forced to Retreat after the joining of the 204th Brigade led by Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi - Operation Karama before later serving as the Minister of Defense in the Al-Wefaq government, and the 21st Brigade and other military formations moved to attack the rebel positions in the city center to coincide with this movement, civilian gunmen (known as the Awakening) moved with military mechanisms to attack The homes of the revolutionaries, so they burned, demolished, and attacked their families in their homes.

Also, those days witnessed torture and executions of civilians who did not deny any of the political or tribal forces loyal to the dignity process, which shocked many of the city's residents. In light of the international silence and the escalation of these operations, a large number of the people of the revolutionaries and families of western origin - estimated at 200 thousand citizens - were forced to leave the city and emigrate to the west of the country . The situation differed in Derna - east of Benghazi - where the Islamists had complete control of the city, and they announced the founding of the Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna and its environs on December 12, 2014, and the Karama forces only launched separate raids on the city, and imposed a suffocating siege on them using the tribal forces from the surrounding areas that were Hostility to a large proportion of the city's social components because they are of Western descent. The city also witnessed an Egyptian bombing that killed civilians in 2015 and 2017 . The siege continued until the beginning of the Operation Karama forces attack on the city in 2017.

ISIS emerged at an early stage in October 2014, and the rivalry between it and the Mujahideen Mujahideen Shura Council intensified until it reached its climax in February 2015, and a 10-month fighting erupted between them, ending with the control of the Dana Shura Council over the city and the withdrawal of ISIS to the city of Sirte. This raised doubts about Haftar's seriousness in fighting the organization, as the organization crossed approximately 700 km passing through the areas of Operation Karamah forces and their checkpoints without being exposed to ground or air forces.



### ❖ Take control of Tripoli

After the success of the Dawn Libya Alliance in controlling Tripoli, the United Nations Mission headed by Bernardino Lyon launched a call for dialogue between the two parties, and the first session of the first round of talks in September 2014 or the second round in October did not record any success, but it increased the size of the cracking in the Dawn Libya Alliance Military operations, as we mentioned, met opposition from wide segments in Misrata and Tripoli, and large brigades such as Halbous and Major Mahjoub from Misrata were reluctant to participate in the beginning, and some leaders from Misrata were accused of preventing ammunition from the rebel brigades highlighted by Colonel Salem Juha - Deputy Chief of Staff The current one - which was a military attaché to the Libyan embassy in the Emirates, and then he was involved in negotiations to unify the military establishment on behalf of the Al-Wefaq government, which was carried out by Egyptian sponsorship, and Marwan al-Haddad - the commander of the Central Military Region - and prominent figures who participated in the Dawn Libya process and contributed to its success in the form of Kabir, headed by MP in Parliament Fathi Pashaga, the current Minister of the Interior, joined other personalities in later stages with the United Nations operation after she was opposed to it, such as Abd al-Rahman Suehli - Speaker of the Council. The supreme state is currently an advisory entity that parallels the National Congress.

The UN mission's approach reinforced this division by selecting parties without the other to participate in the dialogue and by extending the circle of communication of the mission to municipal mayors, military leaders and political activists, which was considered a brutal violation of the authority (the National Congress) and a violation of sovereignty and judicial rulings.

The position of the parties to the Dawn of Libya alliance regarding the intervention of the United Nations Mission was the most important factor in shaping the landscape and map of alliances in the post-coup era and the outbreak of war. The coalition split into a current that opposes the path of the United Nations mission and sees it as a violation of the rule of law and a deviation from the path of the revolution, and a pro-stream that sees it as a way out of the ongoing war and the only way to restore the legitimacy that the international community had removed from the national conference. Representatives in the first stream represented former members of the Islamic Fighting Group and the House of Fatwa The Libyan Mufti, Sheikh Sadiq Al-Gharyani, was represented in the second stream by the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (the Justice and Construction Party). As for the other revolutionary components, prominent personalities, businessmen, politicians, and mayors of the municipalities of the United Nations track have supported.

The largest Misrata and Tripoli brigades sided with this trend. This, in turn, was reflected in the events on the ground, and reconciliation was held, which halted the momentum of military operations in the vicinity of the Al-Wattia base and the area of Rechavana and other fronts. It also stopped the sunrise process launched by the National Conference for the Liberation of Oil Ports in the Crescent Petroleum in December 2014, with international and local pressure. The cessation of military operations and the withdrawal from the fronts had a catastrophic effect on some small cities near Zintan, such as Kikla, which suffered from displacement, liquidation crimes, killing and detention of all those affiliated with the rebels and the Dawn of Libya alliance. It has also had a negative impact on other areas west of Tripoli, where kidnappings and killings have increased over the identity of the tribes army.



### ❖ The post-control phase of Tripoli

The post-control phase of Tripoli and the launching of the rounds of dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations witnessed a significant decline in the influence of the current opposing the approach of the UN mission in the Dawn of Libya coalition. This current suffered great losses at the level of field leaders, as many of them were killed in the ongoing battles, and some others died or were assassinated in mysterious circumstances, the most prominent of which was the killing of Salah al-Baraki and Mustafa al-Ma'azaq in the ongoing battles, the death of Hamouda al-Nayriyya after he was injured in a traffic accident, More than 20 military leaders from Zawiya and Sabratha were killed in a helicopter shooting incident near Warsfana [72], and there was another helicopter crash in Tunisia with the prominent leader Moftah al-Thawadi, the head of the Military Council in Sabratha, and the Emir of the former Islamic Fighting Group .

On the political level, the current was trapped as a result of its stances rejecting the ongoing political path. The head of the rescue government, Omar Al-Hassi, was withdrawn by withdrawing confidence from him by the opposing current in the National Brotherhood. The government weakened the withdrawal of ministers through promises to participate in the next consensual government. This forced more military forces to side with the other .

Twelfth: the international role in reshaping the scene By the beginning of 2015, the country had two governments and two parliaments. While the Camp of Dignity did not suffer a significant division due to the dominance of Khalifa Haftar and his regional allies (Egypt, UAE) over the political decision, the Dawn Libya alliance witnessed major divisions that led to the emergence of new alliances and eventually led to the dismantling of the government and parliament (the National Conference) and the emergence of the Presidential Council and the government of reconciliation the National.

With the start of the second round of dialogue in February 2015, the political parties had repositioned them in two parties, one supporting the negotiating track drawn by the mission and the other rejecting the proposals of the mission that exceeds the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the Supreme Court and who considered the mission biased to the other side, which was later proven true in the Guardian newspaper leaks For the correspondence of the head of the United Nations Mission, Bernardino Leon, with the Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed on December 31, 2014

In which Leon says to Ibn Zayed: In my opinion, the plan to (hold a peace conference) is worse than conducting a political dialogue because he will treat the two parties as if they were equal. He says in the same correspondence that he will not include all the parties in the political dialogue, that he is working to undermine the legitimacy of the National Conference and that all of his steps have been taken in coordination with members of the Tobruk Parliament and the Libyan ambassador to the knowledgeable Emirates, and he said that he is working to dismantle the alliance between Misurata merchants. Islamists. "Lyon concludes his message by saying that he offered him a high position as a senior adviser to all UN mediation missions, and this would give the Emirates an influence on most mediation missions, but of course if you want to I am satisfied with my position in the diplomatic academy, I will reject the offer. "Contrary to the expected, the Guardian leaks did not have political consequences, despite their seriousness. The National Conference continued to reject the proposed draft agreement



### ❖ The Skhirat Agreement

Although the majority of the Tobruk Parliament and the National Congress rejected the political agreement, the United Nations mission went on its path and chose political figures and officials from both parties (Parliament and the Conference) to sign the final version of the agreement on December 17, 2015, and members of the Presidential Council that included 5 deputies and 3 members were announced. Members represented different regions and parties to the conflict and they are Ahmed Maitiq, a businessman - representing Misurata, Fathi al-Majbari, loyal to Haftar and Ibrahim al-Jadran from the Crescent Petroleum, Ali al-Qatrani, a representative of Haftar, and Musa al-Kouni as representative of the south, Abd al-Salam Kagman - representative of the Brotherhood - from the south, Omar al-Aswad representing al-Zintan Muhammad Amari, representative of the Islamic Association from the East, Ahmed Hamza, representative of the supporters of the previous regime from the south, and Fayez al-Sarraj, a member of the Tobruk Parliament, was installed as President of the Presidential Council. Moments about signing the agreement.

The signing of the agreement culminated in the entry of the Presidential Council of Tripoli on the back of a frigate coming from Tunisia on March 30, 2016, and the Council and the Government of Concord gained international support and became the country's legitimate representatives in international forums. The Islamists participating in the consensual government declared that the political agreement ended Haftar's coup with the stroke of Qalam Qalam, and that the Libyan state regained its international legitimacy, but Haftar announced his rejection of the agreement and continued its military operations in the east of the country against the Islamists and its south against the battalions affiliated with Al-Wefaq. In return, the Presidential Council announced that the forces His affiliate will not get involved in an armed conflict with political partners.

The Skhirat Agreement did not result in any real agreement between the conflicting parties. Rather, it resulted in the replacement of the National Congress and the Dawn of Libya alliance with the Presidential Council and the Government of Accord, while the Karama camp did not suffer from any dismantling or division, and the military conflict between the Dawn Libya and Karama camps turned into a conflict between the camps of dignity and reconciliation. Although the Al-Wefaq camp offered significant political and field concessions to Haftar and extended it a hand of friendship and partnership and announced its support for Haftar's military campaign in the east and south, and even in some cities of the West as Sabratah, these efforts did not discourage Haftar from his position.

### ❖ Forming a government of National Accord and abusing its opponents

The entry of the presidential council and the formation of the government of national accord (GNA) were followed by changes in the map of influence at the political and security levels, so the influence of the Misrata Brigades decreased in the capital, while the pro-reconciliation forces of the Tripoli Brigades expanded on the ground and in the corridors of power, such as the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade led by Haitham al-Tajouri, the deterrence force led by Abd al-Raouf Kar, and al-Nawasi led by Abd Latif, Mustafa Qaddour, and the Central Security Abu Salim led by Ghanwa al-Kakli. During 2016-2017, Tripoli witnessed a restructuring of political and economic institutions and sporadic military battles to eradicate the forces opposing the Skhirat Agreement and the Presidential Council,



Among which were the most prominent:

- Attacking and storming the Hadaba prison, which was under the control of the National Guard, under the command of Khaled al-Sharif - a former member of the Islamic Fighting Group - in which Ibn Qaddafi al-Saadi and Abdullah al-Sanusi, the right-arm of Gaddafi, and the head of the external security apparatus, were located.
- Attacking the Al-Ihsan Brigade, led by Tariq Derman, a former member of the Islamic Combatant Group, in Al-Nasr Forest near the headquarters of the National Conference
- Attacking the headquarters of the Salah al-Baraki Brigade in the Abu Salim area. Attacking the headquarters of the National Congress to replace it with the Supreme Council of State.

The capital also witnessed violence and violations by the forces loyal to the Accord, the most prominent of which was the attack on the house of Khaled al-Sharif and its demolition, the burning of the house of the leader Salah al-Baraki, the kidnapping of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Endowments in the Salvation Government, Tariq al-Dagil, and the attack on the home of Abdel Wahab al-Qayed, a member of the National Congress - a member of the former Islamic Fighting Group. - And shooting at Dar Al Ifta, attacking the Haitham Tagouri Brigade of the headquarters of the Al-Nabaa channel loyal to the revolutionary movement and owned by Abd al-Hakim Belhaj - former Emir of the Fighting Islamic Group , kidnapping and liquidation of the Secretary-General of the Libyan Scholars Authority and deputy head of the Legislative Review and amendment committee in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Sharia Nader El-Amrani [80]. The period also witnessed a campaign of arrests of revolutionaries from Benghazi and Derna .

The mere affiliation with the Islamic movement rejecting the Skhirat agreement became a threat to its owner, which prompted many prominent figures and officials to leave the country for fear of liquidation or arrest. In short, that stage witnessed a shift in the compass of loyalty and hostility. Haftar transformed from an enemy to a political partner, and the revolutionary Islamic trend shifted from a political partner to an enemy, and political and military liquidation operations targeted the movement.



### ❖ Privacy of the eastern front

The general atmosphere on the Eastern Front differed completely, there was no talk of truce or dialogue, and there were no differences on how to resolve the conflict with the counter-revolution camp, because everyone believed that the solution lay in military resolution. This did not prevent both the Benghazi Revolutionaries' Revolution and the Derna Shura Council from holding talks with some tribal forces with the aim of neutralizing them from the ongoing conflict, but none of these attempts culminated in success.

The Eastern Front had its own characteristics due to the jihadist presence in Benghazi, Derna, Ajdabiya, and the emergence of the state organization as an ally of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council in its battle against the forces of Operation Dignity. These factors formed a barrier between the revolutionary forces in the west and east of the country. The strong jihadist presence made putting the battle under the anti-terrorism clause agreed upon between the international and regional parties, which made the link to support the Eastern Front a political disadvantage, but this did not prevent members of the Congress, the government, the Dar al-Ifta and Mufti movement from continuing to provide support to the rebels.

Supporting the Eastern Front was one of the critical points in defining the Western position on the political parties. Most of the politicians grabbed this idea from the western embassies and the United Nations Mission at an early stage, and they chose to distance themselves from this problem in their lives.

Despite the continued flow of logistical support from Misurata and the western region, the declining influence of the revolutionary movement in the West and its exclusion from the political process reflected negatively on the Eastern Front, which was not part of the ongoing dialogue process. Military operations in it did not stop during the armistice and negotiations, or even after the signing of the political agreement. Also, the crimes and violations that followed the events of October 15, 2014 were not shed light on them [82], and they did not enter into political calculations and under these circumstances the Eastern Front gradually isolated from the events in the west of the country, and with the entry of the Presidential Council to Tripoli and its assumption of power it became merely expressing loyalty to the Benghazi and Darnah revolutionaries.

In Tripoli, it is reprehensible and may even lead you to the deterrence force prisons. The political agreement that was said to have foiled Haftar's coup and took it out of the scene with a stroke of pen appeared as if it had backfired and strengthened the legitimacy of the coup and cemented Haftar's role in the political process.



### ❖ Foreign intervention in the country has expanded

With the expansion of the influence of the Presidential Council in Tripoli and the penetration of its brigades into the state's joints, foreign interference expanded in the east of the country in support of Haftar in light of international and local silence. Mercenaries provided by Prince Prince, according to the report of the Intelligence Online Magazine - to provide air cover for the dignity forces in the Benghazi and Derna battles. The STARTFOR center revealed the presence of a French operations room at Benina Air Force Base and the presence of 180 French military personnel in Benghazi to support Haftar's forces . As the battle intensified and the forces of the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries were intensified, Haftar used Russian experts and technicians from the RSB company to remove mines. Mercenary forces started flowing from Sudan and Chad .

With the expansion of foreign interference and the increasing regional and international parties supporting Hifter, the complexity of the political and security landscape. However, this complexity did not affect the consensual tone of the Al-Wefaq government, so it overlooked the issue of foreign interference and did not show a response that would rise to the seriousness of this development. With the escalation of fighting in the east and its subsistence in the west, the Islamic State has emerged as a developing force in Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Sabratha, and began launching operations against all parties. September 28, 2015, the operations of the organization that focused mostly on the Misurata forces escalated until they culminated in the attack of the Military Council forces in Misurata in the Sadada Gate on May 5, 2015, which led the Misurata forces, accompanied by forces from the western region, to launch the Bunyan Al-Marsous operation in April 2016 to eliminate the organization in Sirte, which it witnessed US air intervention in its second half in August 2016 and ended in December 2016.

The launch of the Bonyan Al-Marsous process was accompanied by the announcement of a coalition of Benghazi revolutionaries, Derna, and Ajdabiya on the formation of the Benghazi Defense Brigades in May 2016 with the aim of supporting the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council in its war against Haftar's forces. The coalition took its base from Al-Jufra. Unlike the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, the companies did not hide their hostile stance against the Islamic State, and provided support to the Banyan al-Marsous forces in their battle in Sirte in an attempt to address rumors about the Benghazi revolutionaries and to register a political position to be reckoned with.

This period witnessed the rivalry between the two former allies, Ibrahim Al-Jadran and the successor of Haftar, after the first announcement of his recognition of the Accord government and his accession to it after obtaining \$ 42 million from it. [85] From the defeat of Al-Karamah forces until they reached the Al-Makron area less than 70 km from Benghazi, and also managed to shoot down a foreign helicopter that resulted in the killing of 3 French soldiers on July 20, 2016 , and Khalifa Haftar's forces seemed unable to confront the Benghazi rebels on Two fronts. Despite the successes of the military companies, foreign interference prevented it from reaching Benghazi, as its forces were subjected to fierce aerial bombardment - believed to be Egyptian [87] - that resulted in the death of more than 40 people, which constituted a severe blow to a force whose number did not exceed 200/300. Air strikes escalated and the defense companies were forced to retreat from their bases, which were also hit.



#### ❖ The Militia retreated and Haftar's forces controls the oil ports

The retreat of the Saraya followed the control of Haftar's forces over the oil ports and expelled the Guard of Facilities and Ibrahim Al-Jadran from the Al-Hilal oil region, so that the Defense Brigades returned to control the ports again in March 2017. At that time, I offered them to the Presidential Council to receive them, but their offer was rejected because the Al-Wifaq camp did not want to enter in a clash with Haftar [88]. With the help of mercenaries from the Justice and Equality Movement, Haftar managed to regain control of the ports and then headed to the Al-Jafra base - the strategy - and was able to control them to tighten its grip on the central and southern regions. It is worth noting here that these battles witnessed the use of mercenaries from both sides from Sudan and Chad, as reports have proven the success of the Defense Brigades in purchasing loyalties of mercenaries recruited and used by Haftar [89].

With the companies failing to dismantle the siege on Benghazi, and the intensification of foreign air strikes on the forces of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and its naval supply lines, Haftar managed to tighten the noose on the Benghazi rebels and the state organization and besieged them in the area of Qanfudah. In early January 2017, ISIS withdrew from Benghazi towards the south, in coordination with Haftar forces leader Mahmoud Al-Warfalli [90], who later appeared in several videos while he executed prisoners from the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and represented their corpses [91]. This was the second time that Haftar had provided a "safe passage" for ISIS for the western and southern regions.

On March 19, 2017, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council succeeded in partially lifting the siege and joining its besieged forces in the north of the city, and was able to withstand another year during which its forces worked to infiltrate and remove the fighters from the area individually. They succeeded in gradually removing most of the fighters and addressing the attacks of Haftar's forces until March 2018, when the Haftar forces declared their full control of the city after a war that lasted for nearly 4 years. As the battle of Benghazi ended, Haftar began preparing to launch an attack on the city of Derna. The battles between the Dignity Forces and the Derna Revolutionary Shura Council began in late 2017 and ended in June 2018 with the victory of the Dignity Forces.



### ❖ One-Sided War

The years 2017 and 2018 witnessed meetings between Al-Sarraj and Haftar in Abu Dhabi, Paris, and Palermo to discuss the conditions of the latter to accept joining the political agreement. In each of these meetings, Haftar showed intransigence on Article 8 of the political agreement, which grants the President the powers of the Supreme Leader. Despite this intransigence, Haftar agreed to hold elections and to keep Al-Sarraj as prime minister until it is held. Meetings to unify the military establishment between the military committees of the two parties continued under Egyptian supervision.

An agreement was reached on a final draft agreement in which Haftar will be the commander-in-chief of the army, but the negotiations witnessed a stalemate in which the Al-Wefaq camp feared a clause in the draft stipulating that "the army will submit to the will of the people", meaning that he will not submit to civilian authority before the elections. Military committee negotiations and Haftar's meetings with al-Sarraj did not prevent the first from continuing military operations through which he managed to control the oil crescent and important military bases such as Al-Jafra and wished ,,,with the support of his regional and international allies who supported the political agreement (Egypt, UAE, Jordan, France, Russia ).

While the political stalemate continued in light of the Tobruk parliament rejecting all government formations and Haftar adhered to the condition of assuming the position of commander in chief of the army as his forces continued to lie on the ground with the blessing of al-Sarraj and other officials in the Al-Wefaq government, such as Fathi Pashaga, the interior minister, who blessed the victory of the "army" in Murzuq in 20 February 2019 . Al-Sarraj and Haftar met again in (Abu Dhabi) on February 27, 2019 to emphasize the need to end the transitional phase and the necessity to go to the elections.

In March, the UN envoy, Ghassan Salameh, announced that an inclusive conference would be held between 14 and 16 April. The conference enjoyed great international and local support, and Haftar expressed optimism at the Youth Forum of the city of Benghazi, where he stated that the coming weeks will witness the formation of a new consensual government, while Al-Sarraj stressed in his speech at the Arab Summit that "the militarization of the state is a red line" [95]. The ongoing conflict seemed to be ending until the Haftar attack on Tripoli on April 4, 2019, days before the forthcoming Ghadames conference, which shocked officials of the GNA government.



### ❖ Tripoli before the Haftar attack on April 4, 2020

During the past years, the capital witnessed an unprecedented encroachment of the influence of the Tripoli Brigades (deterrence, crusades, Tripoli revolutionaries, martyrs "Abu Salim") in state institutions and the banking sector, and a competition among them for various means of financial revenue. It preceded the establishment of its hegemony over banks and financial institutions, which allowed it to reach the hard currency at the official exchange rate through the documentary credits granted by the Central Bank, which were sold again on the black market at multiples of double, which led to the inflation and wealth of the leaders of these formations in an unprecedented way. In addition to the huge financial returns and monopolization of hard currency with a group of businessmen, these brigades worked to appoint their men in influential positions in the banking sector, ministries and embassies, and also provided privileges to small affiliates by providing their monthly salaries in cash, while the country suffered from a lack of liquidity and the collapse of the value of the local currency due to the closure of oil and corruption in the banking sector and frauds in relation to documentary credits.

The rebel brigades previously exercised forms of pressure and corruption to obtain bids and financial allocations, but they did not get involved in establishing an organized corruption network of this size and influence as the Tripoli Brigades managed to form a network of relationships inside and outside the state institutions with officials, politicians, bank managers and businessmen that allowed them to penetrate the departments of state-owned companies Banks, the Libyan Investment Corporation and other sensitive ministries and positions. The battalions' practices were not limited to mutual cooperation through their relations in the institutions, but rather overcame them with coercion in many cases. The kidnapping of managers and officials and forcing them to sign contracts and deals was a frequent issue at the hands of these four formations in Tripoli.

Some examples are:

1. Haitham Al-Tajouri, commander of the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, extorted documentary credits in the tens of millions of dollars, according to a report by the United Nations team of experts.
2. Haitham Al-Tajouri installed one of his men as director of the medical supply system.
3. Inauguration of the Nawasi Brigade for its men in both the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Status Authority.
4. The kidnapping of senior central bank officials as director of operations and director of the governor's office.
5. The Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade kidnapped the Minister of Transport to force him to sign a contract granted to an Italian company to build Tripoli International Airport.
6. The kidnapping of the CEO of African Airlines to sign an insurance contract for an aircraft company.
7. The deterrence force, the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, and Abdel-Ghani al-Kakli, senior officials of African Airways, were kidnapped at various times in 2017.
8. Kidnapping deterrence of the Libyan Airlines company CEO for 8 months.
9. Appoint more than twenty employees of the men of these battalions in embassies after surrounding the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade owns an office.
10. The inauguration of Muhammad al-Merdas as Libyan ambassador to Tunisia by threatening the former ambassador after besieging his home in Tripoli.



These examples illustrate the extent to which these four battalions dominate the internal administrative decision and the extent of their infiltration in state institutions. This matter raised the wrath of the Phalange from the cities surrounding Tripoli, such as Misrata, Zintan, Zawiya, Tarhuna, Berbers, and other excluded factions inside Tripoli, such as the Tajura and Jansour Brigades, as the atmosphere of division and conflict between the forces under the banner of Al-Wefaq dominated the western region.

#### ❖ Haftar's exploitation of weak situation

In light of the liquidation campaign that affected the forces opposed to the political agreement, and in light of the Tripoli brigades' preoccupation with the state institutions and the discontent of other battalions, Hifter began attempts to co-opt some of these battalions, so the entities were sought from Tarhuna - a military formation, a mixture of different components from Tarhuna that were hostile to Haftar's forces previously, Al-Daab in Gharyan, a leader who fought in the ranks of Libya's dawn against Haftar in 2014,

Also relied on the stream to strengthen his influence in the western areas of Tripoli as Sorman and Sabratah. He worked to communicate with some of the leaders of the other Tripoli brigades, Kanaji Al-Qunaidi, the commander of the Janasour Brigade - who fled the city with some of his men after Haftar failed to storm it - and it was agreed even with the brigades from the city of Zawiya to enter Tripoli. All this was done in parallel with the progress of Haftar's forces in southern Libya and the conduct of negotiations with the government of reconciliation and the leaders of the city of Misurata for power-sharing.

There was also talk during that period about the communication of some leaders of the Tripoli Brigades, such as Haitham Al-Tajouri and Hashim Bishr - the security adviser to Al-Sarraj Security - with Haftar and their agreement with him to hand over Tripoli peacefully, and there is no evidence to confirm this, except that the two had a relationship with the UAE and France. Many of the leaders of the rebel brigades confirmed the allegations. The information circulated confirms that the two are now fleeing the country and moving between Paris and (Abu Dhabi), and that the Central Bank has frozen documentary credits of 395 million dinars for the leader of the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Haitham al-Tajouri .

Haftar based his plan to enter Tripoli on the factor of lack of confidence and conflict between the Western Region brigades. If Haftar took control of western Tripoli, the major Tripoli battalions would have withdrawn from the battle, but what happened exactly the opposite is the Al-Zawiyah Brigades, which he believed neutralized his forces besieged his forces immediately after his attack on the western entrance and managed to capture an entire battalion with its equipment - more than 120 prisoners - and the other strike came with the joining Zintan brigades of the Al-Wefaq forces under the leadership of Osama al-Juwaili, such as the forces of Imad Traboulsi, who fought against the Fajr forces in Libya in 2014.

The Misrata Brigades, Tripoli, and various regions called for a rapid response to the attack, and yesterday's opponents and enemies formed a coalition to repel the Haftar attack. While the Alliance of Concord Forces formed from the revolutionaries of the western cities that stood against the regime in the revolution such as Misrata, Zintan, Sabratah, Zawiya, Gharyan, and the cities of the Western Mountain, most of Haftar's forces were formed from the western cities from the areas that had fallen into the regime as Tarhuna, Warsfana, Bani Walid, Tawergha, Sirte and Sabha. Although some of these cities have declared their neutrality, they are bases for launching and supplying Haftar forces, and most of the fighters in the western region are affiliated with it.



The various stages that the Libyan revolution has gone through since its inception formulated these complex alliances. In the events of 2011, alliances of the revolution areas against the regime areas emerged. Then in 2014 some of the forces of the revolution in the east and west sided with the camp of the counter-revolution, and then the composition of the alliances changed again after the political agreement. Finally, with the Haftar attack on Tripoli, old alliances returned and new ones emerged. However, these alliances remain vulnerable to disintegration, in the absence of a threat to the existence of their components.

#### ❖ The components of the Libyan scene

The political and military scene has undergone many changes since 2011, and new parties have emerged as actors at the expense of others. The Benghazi Revolutionaries Brigade, which was one of the most prominent and influential components of the square, no longer had a prominent presence or influence on behalf of Haftar's forces, and Ibrahim Jadran's forces that dominated the Crescent Petroleum region and prevented the export of oil for years that had become from the past after Haftar's domination of the federal current, and after it had had battalions Zintan is the strongest presence in Tripoli - after Misrata - today it is on the sidelines in the military scene in favor of Misrata and the Tripoli Brigades, as the southern forces underwent great changes after attracting Haftar to other tribes, so the influence of the Tabu diminished in favor of the Zawiya in the infidels and in favor of Suleiman's children and Al-Muqarra in Fezzan. On the political front, the role of all political currents loyal to the dignity process has disappeared in favor of Haftar's political vision. On the other side, the role of the Alliance Dawn of Libya has diminished in favor of the Accord Movement. This may change in the coming period due to the war conditions.

In light of these changes, some intellectual and political currents maintained their presence in the political and security scenes to this day through various means such as money and political relations, or military power or international support - regionally or through the holding of local alliances, most notably: the revolutionary current in Misrata and some western cities despite the exposure of part A great deal of it is for deportation after the Skhirat political agreement, but it is still the strongest component, the entrance current (with both parties to the conflict), whose presence in the Al-Wefaq camp may be reduced after the recent Haftar campaign, the Muslim Brotherhood despite their low popularity, but their political presence in the Al-Wefaq camp is strong, and the successor of Haftar who It receives international-regional support that no other party enjoys.

It can be said that these parties are the most prominent and most present in the current scene, but they do not monopolize the scene completely. There are a group of supporters and officials of the previous regime who returned to the political scene after the Skhirat agreement and assume important positions in both parties. With the agreement, there is Foreign Minister Mohamed Siala - a former foreign minister - and Hafiz Kaddour, the European Union delegate - the former ambassador of Libya in Rome - and Jumaa Ibrahim, the African Union delegate - and the former minister of African affairs - Ahmed Hamza, a member of the Presidential Council - a former revolutionary committee member -, Abdel Qader Al Tohamy Director of General Intelligence - Director of the External Security Bureau in Sabha (recently died in May 2020), Hamid al-Hudayri, the personal envoy to al-Sarraj for France - a former ambassador to France, Belgium, and several West African countries - and the list goes on, but on the other side, Haftar appears to trust only officials The former regime's officers are almost all military leaders of the regime's officers, such as Abd al-Salam al-Lahhasi, the commander of the Tripoli Liberation Operations Room, al-Mabrouk Sahban, the commander of the ground forces, Hassan Ma'touq al-Zadamah, the commander of the battalion 128, Tawfiq al-Qumati, the commander of the Tariq bin Ziyad battalion, Muhammad bin Nayel, the brigade's 12th commander, Masoud Jadi Battalion Commandant 166,



Belkacem Al-Abaj, Commander of the Southern Military Region. On the level of government positions, Ibrahim Bouchnaf holds the position of Minister of Interior - former President of the People's Court and State Security Court - Abd al-Hadi al-Hawaij - a close associate of Saif al-Qadhafi - holds the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the post of Military Prosecutor General, Faraj al-Sa'sa.

Although these characters on both sides of the conflict are affiliated with the former regime, they do not constitute a coherent and unified current. And overshadowed by the search for individual interest and the desire to return to power. It can be said that this current is being "employed" by the conflicting parties to benefit from their "expertise" and their external and internal relations.

#### ❖ The Role of previous regime officials with both Libyan sides

Just as the elements of the previous regime hold basic and important positions on both sides, the entrance current plays a similar role but far from politics, its presence is limited to the security and military sides in addition to its domination over religious institutions and bodies and mosques and its possession of dozens - 28 broadcasts - radio broadcasts across the country , and therefore can To say that the current focused its activities and its advocacy movement on the social environment and armed formations.

The current played an important role in bringing the camps of Al-Karama and Al-Wefaq closer, as armed formations and prominent advocacy figures in it followed each other across the country, despite their dependence on two conflicting powers. Despite his presence on both sides, the representation of the current in Al-Karama camp is stronger and more prominent than that of Al-Wefaq. Haftar relies heavily on the loyalty of the Salafi in entrance to him, as he entrusted them to the Ministry of Endowments for the government of the Thinni, religious institutions and mosques in the east and south of Libya, and relies on them in the management of torture camps. 2019 by the head of the office of Haftar and his cousin Aoun al-Farajani - the closest of his personalities - and his military forces are full of current elements and after they had one battalion at the beginning of the fighting in 2014 they became present in most of the battalions (210,302, 106, al-Adiyat, the Naval Forces , And other battalions and formations) in what appears to be a security policy aimed at consolidating its hegemony over a mixture of different armed formations and approaches.

The elements of the current have played a big role in paving the way for Haftar and extending its hegemony over the western cities such as Zintan, Sorman, Sabratah and others, as Haftar's acceptance rates in these areas are low compared to the cities in the east and cities loyal to the previous regime. The current was not only entrusted with promoting Hifter and fighting with him and managing the detention centers, but rather to carry out assassinations and liquidation operations, as stated by Faraj Qaid, the Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry and a former commander in the Dignity Forces. The commander of the Salouq Force Commander, Qajah al-Fakhiri, was arrested after proving his involvement in Thirty-eight civilians were killed in what was known as the Al-Abyar massacre, but Haftar ordered the storming of the prison and his release, and arresting Faraj Qaeem. The 106 battalion of Ibn Haftar stormed the village of Persaes and was able to arrest a leader and put him in prison. The names of those accused of carrying out other assassinations in the interest of Haftar as Ahmad Al-Lahsi have emerged.



This strong presence of the current in the ranks of Haftar corresponds to a more modest presence in the ranks of Al-Wefaq with the nature of the multiplicity and diversity of the components of Al-Wefaq and the domination of other groups over the political and military decision. But this does not mean that the current role is marginal, as it controls most of the mosques in Tripoli and the western region, controls almost 80% of the endowment offices, and in Tripoli alone, it has 4 out of 9 broadcasts in the western region, and it has private schools in Tripoli in the Al-Hadba, Al-Hani and Abu Salem regions. It has its own military formations such as the confidentiality of the door of Tajura and 604 and the special deterrent force and has a strong presence in other formations, such as the Yarmouk Brigade and the Crowds and others.

The influence of the movement witnessed a great escalation after the GNA's government entered and established its authority in the capital, as the authority relied on deterrence to fight crime and entrusted it with a file of "combating terrorism", which gave it wide powers and allowed for the expansion of its influence, and in May 2018, Al-Sarraj issued a decision to transfer the deterrence force to the deterrent apparatus. To combat crime and terrorism, which freed it from the restrictions imposed on it by the Ministry of the Interior, and gave it broader powers, such as:

1. Monitor communications and social media.
2. The members of the apparatus have been granted the status of "judicial officers".
3. Allocating it to the confiscated property and funds as a source of financing for the agency.
4. Security cooperation with international and regional bodies.
5. Provide feedback on laws, regulations and security agreements, monitor the media and collect information

With the expansion of the influence of the current, its hostility against other Islamic tendencies escalated, led by the stream of Dar al-Ifta, the Grand Mufti of Sheikh al-Sadiq al-Ghayriani, and the deserted eastern revolutionaries. A campaign of arrests began in Tripoli and sometimes Misrata affected hundreds of people, in light of the silence of the Al-Wefaq government and its officials. The number of detainees in the deterrent force prisons is estimated at 2,600 prisoners, of whom approximately 400 are affiliated with ISIS.

The current violations were not limited to arrest, kidnapping, and torture, but amounted to physical liquidation, as in the incident of the kidnapping of Sheikh Nader Al-Amrani, Secretary-General of the Association of Scholars of Libya and a member of the Association of Islamic World Scholars. And Abdul Hakim Muqaydish, the commander of the Anti-Crime Force in the region of Sibaiya, Al-Azhari Vanan, the commander of the Bab Tajura Brigade, and Ahmed al-Safi, the Egyptian student Muhammad Saeed Raslan, who admitted to bringing in a fatwa from abroad to assassinate a number of preachers, scholars and Islamists - as stated in the confessions of Haitham al-Zintani, one of the participants in the crime .

Despite the dependence of part of the portal current in the western region of the Al-Wefaq government, the political inclinations of it remained mysterious, and its formations and prominent personalities in it did not announce a clear position on Haftar, but some of the prominent figures in the current had contacted with Haftar's representatives. After Haftar's forces attacked the capital on April 4,



some formations, such as the 604th Battalion, showed their loyalty to him and later joined the ranks of his forces, facilitating his entry into Sirte, which was under their control, while prominent figures in the current remained silent for a long time, and others called for bloodshed. Mosques and platforms remained "neutral", while current platforms on the other side were calling for "jihad" with Haftar against "the Brotherhood and the Kharijites," while the deterrence apparatus announced its participation in the fighting more than two months after the attack on the capital, but members of it participated Prior to this by virtue of its multiple components, the device is not only a component of the "entrance" stream, but it also includes former revolutionaries and youth from the Friday Market - Abdel Raouf Karah area, the leader of the device - an area that has been constantly bombarded by Haftar forces since the beginning of the fighting, and it also includes elements of internal security And external

#### ❖ Saudi Arabia and financing the intervention

The methods of financing the current are still unknown, but the informal talk on the street indicates to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that the current is linked to the sheikhs of the kingdom and what is known about the Saudi state's sponsorship of the current inside and outside its borders. It possesses modern equipment and technologies that many brigades do not have in the western region, and projects such as radio broadcasts located in almost all cities of Libya and private schools deployed in Tripoli and other activities that require massive funding, all these activities are not explained by donations or support of businessmen associated with the movement as a slave The Egyptian Hakim and others .

#### ❖ Regional and international players in Libya

Since 2011, the country has come under the influence of external interference, which has been the most important factor in the process of polarization and keeping the conflict alive between the conflicting parties. Qatar played a role in supporting the rebels and the Islamists through Islamic figures such as the Brotherhood member Ali Al-Sallabi and his brother Ismail and the former Emir of the Combat Islamic Group Abdel Hakim Belhadj, and on the other side the UAE provided support to the "counter-revolution" alliance through figures with different backgrounds such as the liberal Mahmoud Jibril, the military Khalifa Haftar, and a man The business: Abdul Majeed Al-Maqita, the businessman and the Sufi preacher, Aref Al-Nayed. Compared to the Qatari support, the UAE support was generous and unlimited. While the Qatari support witnessed a decline after 2016, the UAE support witnessed a major escalation that culminated in the construction of the "Al Khadem" military base in eastern Libya and the import of American aircraft and brought in mercenaries through the famous security contractor "Air Prince" and also provided Haftar With Chinese drones .

Emirati support for Haftar's military operations continued until the date of his attack on Tripoli, and with the launch of the UN-sponsored dialogue process the UAE intervention witnessed a development where the UAE succeeded in influencing the results of the political agreement by attracting politicians and officials by various means and operations were not limited Polarization and the purchase of receivables at local parties, but included international officials and staff, most notably the United Nations envoy Bernardino Leon, as we mentioned earlier.

The number of media platforms funded by the Emirates has reached 7, which are "Libya with a soul of the homeland" managed by the knowledgeable knowledgeable, "Gateway and Radio Al Wasat" managed by the liberal Mahmoud Shammam, "218" managed by the feminist media Hoda Al-Sarari and her husband Mujahid Busaifi, "Africa News Portal Run by Abdul Basit Bin Hamel, "Al Hadath Libya" is managed by Mahmoud Hassan, and "Libya 24", which is loyal to the previous regime and run by Abdul Salam Al Mashri.



### ❖ The emergence of the French role

With the escalation of the battle in Benghazi, the French role in supporting Haftar has emerged, and the Startfour Center has published satellite images indicating the presence of operating rooms at the Benina base run by foreign military personnel believed to be French. The Middle East Eye website also leaked radio talks between foreign military personnel in We built a base with a plane ready to land .

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, then defense minister, had an important role in ramping up support for Haftar. Several French news and security websites (Monde Afrique and Wantlangnes Online) spoke of the minister's enthusiasm to support Haftar and that he was the architect of the support strategy. Ludryan's personal relationship with Mohamed bin Zayed and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi appears to have played an important role in boosting the French presence. The minister had been visiting almost every month in the UAE

since 2012, and he was known to be close to the two Doubts about the nature of French support were discontinued on July 20, 2016, when the Benghazi revolutionaries shot down a helicopter with three French soldiers on board, and both the French President Hollande and the Minister of Defense Laudiane had comforted them the next day and justified this by saying that these soldiers were carrying out anti-terrorist missions . However, the Haftar attack on Tripoli revealed that the French role exceeded the so-called "anti-terrorism". Information emerged about the presence of French soldiers and French weapons in Gharyan, and the information was confirmed after the reconciliation forces entered the city of Gharyan and the families of leaders in the Haftar forces and detected the escape of 13 soldiers French from the city and they reached the Tunisian border. France denied that these soldiers were supportive of Haftar and confirmed that they were a security team that was protecting the French embassy.

### ❖ Russian support for Haftar

In addition to Emirati / Egyptian / French support, Haftar has received the support of Russia, which is looking for:

1. Foothold south of the Mediterranean.
2. Securing its outstanding economic interests since the fall of the Gaddafi regime.
3. Crushing and marginalizing the European role in the Libyan scene.
4. Obtaining pressure cards on European opponents, while Haftar, in his alliance with Russia, is searching for an ally that relieves the pressure of France and regional allies.

Despite its support for Haftar, Russia maintains ties with the other side of the conflict. It appears that it is seeking to blackmail it with its growing support for Haftar, as Russian support has been on the rise since 2016. After being limited to logistical and technical support, today it includes providing Haftar with mercenaries and planning for military operations on the outskirts of Tripoli. The number of fighters of the "Wagner" company is estimated between 800-1400, according to a US Defense Department report on 9-2019, while the Turkish president stated that the number of Russian fighters amounted to 2500 fighters , while field estimates based on the size of the deployment and the number of vehicles brought in For their benefit it indicates the presence of at least 3,000 fighters.

In addition to logistical and military support, Russia provided another kind of support to Haftar by providing a solution to the liquidity crisis that confronted him. The Guznak Foundation - the official institution for coining the Kremlin - printed a total of 15.4 billion Libyan dinars = 11 billion dollars, which was delivered to the parallel central bank in the east, which exacerbated From the economic crisis in Libya and weakened the value of the Libyan dinar against the dollar. A report by the "Dossier" Foundation also mentioned that Wagner is responsible for publishing the newspaper "Voice of the People" that promotes Haftar



vigorously, and that the company submitted recommendations to the "Libya Hadath" channel owned by Ibn Haftar "Saddam" . Despite Haftar's extensive support, but Russia's options do not seem to be limited to him, the report states that the company is working to promote Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through a group of Libyan channels in which he has a 50% stake, and a report by Bloomberg newspaper stated that the company had a meeting with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi attended by a Russian election advisor. The Minister of Interior of the Al-Wefaq government stated that the Russian role seeks to enhance the influence of the former regime and restore power to it.

It appears that Russia's relationship with Haftar is primarily subject to employment, as Haftar tries to use Russian support to balance the roles of his allies and supporters and to obtain military support that other supporters cannot provide, while Russia tries to take advantage of Haftar's need for professional fighters to impose itself in the Libyan scene at the expense of other supporters. A New York Times report entitled "The White House blessed a war in Libya won by Russia." This is true by revealing Russian documents obtained by Al-Wefaq after the arrest of two Russian agents in Tripoli, in which it stated that Russia seeks to gain control of Haftar by strengthening the role of Wagner's mercenaries and by finding a client And in the strong in his camp can compete with him . This shows that the goals of the two sides are different, which opens the way for the assumption that Russia can abandon Haftar if it succeeds in reaching an understanding with Turkey and reconciliation.

Contrary to the Emirati \ French \ Egyptian role, which was not a source of concern to any of the international parties that declare their support for reconciliation. The growing Russian role has emerged as a source of concern for both Britain and America, as Britain warned of it both by the intelligence service and by the defense minister, Malcolon Fallon, since 2017. Britain presented a draft at the Security Council in February 2019 demanding the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from Libya and the AFRICOM leadership accused Russia of seeking to access Libyan oil and revitalizing arms sales, and Washington sent a diplomatic delegation that met Haftar in November 2019 and urged him to stop the attack on the capital and warned him against exploiting Russia to chaos in Libya to enhance its influence. It may mean that the United States will not turn a blind eye to the expanding Russian role as it did with the rest of Haftar's supporters

#### ❖ The floundering American role

The American role appears to be contradictory through its positions. While Washington issues statements calling for stopping the war, the White House gives Haftar the green light to launch an attack on the government he recognizes - according to the previous New York Times report - and the US administration does not seem to be making any serious efforts to rein in the supportive regional parties. Haftar (UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt). It also did not comment on the Emirates' use of American planes in the Benghazi and Derna battles, as well as the role of the American "Eric Prince" in providing them with pilots in light of the arms embargo imposed on the country.

The United States announces its recognition of the Al-Wefaq government as the legitimate representative of the country, and it has provided it with military support in confronting its forces to organize the state in Sirte and is still cooperating with it and providing it with support in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, it does the same with Haftar, as American planes have continuously visited Benina airport for years, and records of aircraft tracking sites show the arrival of 12 American military aircraft from June 29, 2018 to December 14, 2019 at Benina airport in Benghazi. Some interpret the United States giving the green light to its allies (the Emirates of Saudi Arabia and Egypt) with the support of Haftar to attack Tripoli and then denouncing it after the failure of the attack that was supposed to be kidnapped that he had floundered in American policy, while others interpret it as a unilateral decision by Trump and his national security adviser Bolton and that The



position of the American institutions does not represent, and the increasing Russian influence in the Libyan scene may push the United States to take a clearer position on the current events.

#### ❖ The Turkish role in the scene

Although the Al-Wefaq government possesses international legitimacy, it does not appear to have real allies ready to provide support to it in the face of a coalition attack supporting Haftar. In light of this international reluctance, the Turkish role has emerged strongly, as Turkey has pumped great military support by sending armored vehicles, drones and air defense systems, as well as sending Syrian fighters in later stages, which re-balance the battle, and allowed Al-Wefaq forces to regain the initiative and achieve significant progress on several fronts ].

In addition to logistical and military support, Turkey signed a security cooperation agreement and the demarcation of maritime borders with the government of reconciliation, which sparked the protest of Haftar's allies and the international parties directly affected by this agreement (France, Egypt, Greece, Israel). These countries considered that the two agreements signed with the Government of Accord were invalid. Egypt, Greece and France issued a joint statement condemning the agreement, describing it as an infringement of the sovereign rights of other countries and that it does not comply with the law of the sea.

The maritime agreement signed between Libya and Turkey limits the influence of these countries and their ability to move unilaterally marginalizing Turkey in the Mediterranean, as it stands as an obstacle to the Israeli gas pipeline project for Europe, and despite the initial objection of "Israel" to this agreement, some media sources announced that Israel accepted Entering into secret negotiations with Turkey about passing the gas pipeline from Israel through Turkey.

It seems that the alliance with Turkey and the signing of the maritime agreement brought Libya to a new regional international conflict scene and formed the point of no return for the reconciliation government that has tried over the past years to maintain friendly relations with Haftar's allies, which means that the course of events in Libya will be different from what it was before the Turkish intervention and will be affected in a way Directly on the progress of events in other regions where Turkey is a major player, and with the growing Russian role on the other bank and the increasing dependence of the conflicting parties on external support, the similarities of the factors affecting the Libyan file with the Syrian file increase day after day, which raises the concerns of both the UAE and France for fear of losing The first is to control the decision on peace and war on the part of Haftar, and that the second role diminishes with the domination of this duo (Turkey-Russia) over the scene.

#### ❖ Egyptian support for Haftar

Although Egypt plays an essential role in supporting Haftar's forces by providing it with ammunition and armored vehicles and opening its lands and military bases as a crossing and a springboard for various countries supporting Haftar, some press reports speak about Emirati-Saudi attempts to push Egypt to escalate to prevent the continuous collapse of Haftar's forces since the Turkish intervention. The nature of the required escalation is not known, but given the limited Egyptian capabilities in light of the economic crisis facing the country, it is inconceivable that Egypt would be left to this option except in the event that the Egyptian influence in the Libyan East is threatened, and in the absence of a real threat, it does not imagine that an escalation exceeds Surgical air strikes save Haftar, which could result in a greater Turkish escalation after its hinting in recent maneuvers on the borders of Libyan territorial waters.



There have also recently been allegations that Sisi sent Egyptian soldiers to fight in Haftar's ranks in the Battle of Tripoli, but these allegations remain weak, especially given Haftar's use of mercenaries from Sudanese rebel movements such as the Sudan Liberation Movement (Minawi's wing) supported by Chad and other movements loyal to the Sudanese government such as the Revolutionary Awakening Council Affiliated with Musa Hilal, leader of Mahamid. From Chad, like the Front for Rotation and Concord in Chad, and the Union for Power for Democracy and Development - the latter fighting even with GNA forces

## End

**The situation in Libya is summed up in several points:**

**First:** The Libyan internal situation will not settle without the approval of foreign powers, and this will not happen in the near future.

**Second:** The parties to the conflict, whether the Libyan National Army led by Haftar or the government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj, are not ready to sit at the negotiating table. For the simple reason that they are both in a weak position, they must achieve victories and gains on the ground. So that they can negotiate vigorously. It is currently difficult in the case of no peace and no war.

**Third :** While Haftar and his forces are stable. Al-Sarraj and his government are exposed to many problems from the armed militias, whether inside Tripoli or in particular Misurata militias.

The problem of GNA government lies in the absence of a unified leadership, a military bloc to which it complies, and the weak position of the political leadership, and anticipation of Western and international acceptance of its political positions,

This imposes restrictions on the performance of GNA government and prevents the military victories from being fully employed in their favor, and unless these problems are addressed, the GNA will fail to achieve Strategic success, despite its restoration of military preference, and Turkish intervention may address these problems if relations are cemented and cooperation is limited to personalities who have firmness and have local support at the political and military levels, in other words, a new political structure must have a strategic vision, capable of unifying the domestic front and not afraid From pushing towards military decisiveness and bypassing international positions and initiatives that reinforce the opponent's position

**Fourth :**The consequences of the epidemic crisis, the economic crisis, and the closure of oil - whose losses exceeded \$ 4 billion - have not yet appeared on the Libyan conflict, but in light of the accumulation of war expenses and the link of internal parties abroad and the extent of the impact of external support on the course of the ongoing war, we may soon see a return to the political process under conditions and New data.

The Libyan scene is taking place day after day, and the traditional solutions do not seem to be able to end the state of polarization, especially in light of the growing influence of the external parties and the conflicting parties' ties to regional alliances, making Libya a file on the table of

the conflicting countries and linking its events directly to other arenas in which these countries struggle, as well as The reluctance of the United States to prevail over one party over another, and its sufficiency in granting the parties supporting Haftar its agreement to topple the legitimate government at times, and expressing its support to the government at other times, complicating the scene.

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