Ballistic missile defence

Proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Over 30 countries have, or are acquiring, ballistic missile technology that could eventually be used to carry not just conventional warheads, but also weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its core task of collective defence.

Highlights

In 2010, Allies decided to develop a territorial BMD capability to pursue NATO’s core task of collective defence.
NATO has the responsibility to protect its European populations, territory and forces in light of the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles.
In 2012 Allies declared an Interim NATO BMD Capability, as a first step towards Initial and Full Operational Capability.
NATO BMD capability is based on voluntary national contributions.
Several Allies already offered their contributions or are undergoing development or acquisition of further BMD assets such as upgraded ships with ballistic missile-defence capable radars, ground-based Air and Missile Defence systems or advanced detection and alert capability.
At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decided that the scope of the existing Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other national contributions were welcomed as valuable to the NATO BMD architecture.

A year and a half later, at the May 2012 Chicago Summit, Allies declared the Interim NATO BMD Capability, which is an operationally significant first step, offering the maximum coverage within available means to defend the populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack.

However, the aim remains to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the ALTBMD capability.

The Alliance is conducting three BMD-related activities:

1. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence capability

The aim of this capability is to protect deployed NATO forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to 3,000-kilometer range). In order to manage the risk associated with the development of such a complex capability, ALTBMD is being fielded in several phases and eventually will merge with the capabilities for territorial BMD that are being developed in parallel.

The completed capability will consist of a system of systems, comprising low- and high-altitude defences (also called lower- and upper-layer defences), including battle management, communications, command and control and intelligence (BMC3I), sensors and various interceptors. NATO member countries will provide the sensors and weapons systems, while NATO will develop the BMC3I segment and facilitate the integration of all these elements into a coherent and effective architecture.

The ALTBMD programme was launched in 2005 and currently it is now managed by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and its BMD Programme Office.

The initial activities were mainly focused on system engineering and integration work, and on the development of an integration test bed hosted at the NCIA facilities in The Hague, the Netherlands. The integration test bed is essential to validate development work.

In early 2010, the first operational ALTBMD capability (called Interim Capability) was fielded. It provides military planners with a planning tool to build the most effective defence design for specific scenarios or real deployments. A more robust version of that capability was fielded at the end of 2010 and provides shared situational awareness. The next version will be delivered in the 2016-2017 timeframe. After that, ALTBMD will be merged with the BMD effort detailed below.

2. BMD for the protection of NATO European territory, populations and forces

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders decided to develop a BMD capability. They agreed that an expanded ALTBMD Programme should form the command, control and communications backbone of such a system. That decision was based on almost eight years of technical studies and political-military discussions.

In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, NATO leaders declared the Interim NATO BMD Capability operational. It offers the maximum coverage within available means to defend NATO’s populations, territory and forces across southern Europe against a limited ballistic missile attack. The Alliance aims to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This coverage is based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge. It also takes into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and is in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.

As part of the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), Turkey announced in autumn 2011 its decision to host a US-owned and -operated BMD radar at Kürecik. Romania and the United States agreed in 2011 to base Aegis Ashore capabilities at Deveselu airbase in Romania (in the 2015 timeframe), and a similar basing agreement between the United States and Poland entered into force in 2011 to host Aegis Ashore at the Redzikowo military base (in the 2018 timeframe). Also in 2011, Spain and the United States announced an agreement to base four Aegis missile defence ships in Rota, Spain. These assets are national contributions, and are integral parts of the NATO BMD capability.

Several Allies currently offer their ground-based air and missile defence systems (such as Patriot or SAMP/T) or complementary ships for air-defence protection. Others are developing or acquiring BMD assets that could be eventually made available for NATO BMD.

In September 2011, the Netherlands announced plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range missile defence early-warning radars as its national contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability. A similar announcement was made in August 2014 by Denmark, which decided to acquire a frigate-based radar system to enhance NATO BMD.

3. Missile defence cooperation with Russia

In 2003, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a study was launched to assess possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

Together with this study, several successful computer-assisted exercises have been held to provide the basis for future improvements to interoperability, and to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations in the area of theatre missile defence.

NATO and Russia also examined possible areas for cooperation on territorial missile defence, based on their decision at the Lisbon Summit. They agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, and to continue dialogue in this area. In April 2012, NATO and Russia successfully conducted a computer-assisted missile defence exercise hosted by Germany.

In October 2013, NATO-Russia missile defence-related discussions were paused by Russia, and in April 2014, NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis.
Mechanisms
The Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced) (DPPC(R)) is the senior NATO committee that oversees and coordinates all efforts to develop the NATO BMD capability at the political-military level, as well as providing political-military guidance and advice on all issues related to NATO BMD.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior policy committee responsible for the BMD programme.

NATO Military Authorities are responsible for developing a military doctrinal framework for BMD and for BMD operational planning and execution.

Several other NATO senior committees address particular issues related to NATO BMD, such as civil emergency planning, crisis-response measures, or integration of air and missile defence.

Evolution
The key policy document providing the framework for NATO’s activities in the area of BMD is NATO’s Strategic Concept. In addition, BMD is an important aspect of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012.

The Strategic Concept recognises, inter alia, that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.” Therefore, NATO will “develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of our Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” As a defensive capability, BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 states that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. It is a purely defensive capability and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO’s missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary’s planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.

Key milestones

Theatre Missile Defence
May 2001

NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance theatre missile defence system.

June 2004

At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on theatre missile defence be taken forward expeditiously.

March 2005

The Alliance approves the establishment of a Programme Management Organization under the auspices of the CNAD.

September 2006

The Alliance awards the first major contract for the development of a test bed for the system.

February 2008

The test bed is opened and declared fully operational nine months ahead of schedule.

Throughout 2008

The system design for the NATO command and control component of the theatre missile defence system is verified through testing with national systems and facilities via the integrated test bed; this paves the way for the procurement of the capability.

March 2010

The Interim Capability (InCa) Step 1 is fielded.

June 2010

NATO signs contracts for the second phase of the interim theatre missile defence capability, which will include the capability to conduct a real-time theatre missile defence battle.

July 2010

The more robust Interim Capability (InCa 2) passes key tests during the Dutch Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise.

December 2010

At the end of 2010, all InCa 2 components – including BMD sensors and shooters from NATO nations – are linked and successfully tested in an ‘ensemble’ test prior to handover to NATO’s military commanders. InCa 2 is subsequently delivered to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany.

Territorial Missile Defence
November 2002

At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats.

April 2006

The study concludes that ballistic missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by the CNAD.

2007

An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile threat developments is completed.

April 2008

At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They call for options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time for NATO’s next Summit.

April 2009

At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognise that a future US contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of the Alliance effort and judge that ballistic missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.

September 2009

The United States announces its plan for the EPAA.

November 2010

At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decided that the scope of the existing Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’s command, control and communication capabilities will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and other national contributions were welcomed as valuable to the NATO BMD architecture.

June 2011

NATO Defence Ministers approve the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Action Plan.

September 2011

Turkey announces a decision to host a US-owned missile defence radar as part of the NATO BMD capability.

September 2011

Romania and the United States sign an agreement to base a US Aegis Ashore system in Romania as part of NATO’s BMD capability.

September 2011

An agreement between Poland and the United States on basing a US Aegis Ashore system in Poland enters into force.

September 2011

The Netherlands announces plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range radar systems as its national contribution to NATO’s BMD capability.

October 2011

Spain and the United States announce an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability.

February 2012

Germany announces a decision to offer its Patriot air- and missile-defence systems as a national contribution to NATO’s BMD capability.

April 2012

NATO successfully installs and tests the command and control architecture for the Interim Capability at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

May 2012

NATO Summit in Chicago. Declaration of the Interim BMD Capability.

December 2012

NATO decides to augment Turkish air defence against missiles from Syria. Germany, the Netherlands and the United States deploy Patriot air- and missile-defence systems to eastern Turkey.

March 2013

The Unites States announces a revised EPAA.

October 2013

Ground-breaking ceremony for the US Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu, Romania.

February 2014

First US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota, Spain.

June 2014

Second US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota, Spain.

August 2014

Denmark announces the decision to acquire a frigate-based radar system for NATO BMD.

September 2014

NATO Summit in Wales. Allies reiterate basic parameters for NATO BMD and note additional contributions offered or considered by Allies.

NATO-Russia Council (Theatre) Missile Defence Cooperation
2003

A study is launched under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to assess possible levels of interoperability among theatre missile defence systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

March 2004

An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the United States.

March 2005

An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

October 2006

An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in Russia.

January 2008

An NRC theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany.

December 2010

First meeting of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group aimed at assessing decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit and exploring a possible way forward for cooperation on ballistic missile defence.

June 2011

NRC Defence Ministers take stock of the work on missile defence since the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

April 2012

Computer-assisted exercise in Ottobrunn, Germany.

October 2013

Russia unilaterally pauses the discussions on missile defence in the NRC framework.

April 2014

In response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO suspends all cooperation with Russia, including on missile defence.

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How Missile Defence works

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence
The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence
12 May. 2008
…based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. To this end, we have decided that the scope of NATO’€™s current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme’€™s command, control and communications capabilities will be expanded beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory and forces. (Article 36-37, Lisbon Summit declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 20 November 2010.)

Space-based Early Warning
The space-based early warning capability allows the early detection of missile launches through the detection of the heat signature of the missile’€™s rocket motor engine as it burns its fuel. This early detection is communicated to Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Command Centres within a minute or two of the missile launch.

Space-based Early Warning
Space-based early warning is provided to NATO through the United States shared early warning capability. This capability is provided by the current generation Defence Support Program satellites and will, in the future, be provided by the next generation of satellites called Space Based Infrared Satellite System (SBIRS). These satellites identify hostile missile launches by detecting the heat signatures as the missile’€™s rocket motors burn their fuel to boost the missiles into space.

Space-based Early Warning
Future Early Warning Satellite France has developed an initial expertise on early warning, with the experimental space-based satellite SPIRALE. In 2004, the French Ministry of Defence decided to study the development, launch, and operation of the SPIRALE program. The two micro-satellites, which are composed of the demonstrator system, were launched by Ariane 5 in February 2009. Continued studies will be conducted on early warning capabilities including satellite-based systems as stated by the 2013 Defence White Paper.

Land- and sea based sensors
Once the hostile missile has exhausted all of its fuel and the engine burns out, thereby losing its heat signature, it is tracked by long-range radars.

Land- and sea based sensors
23 Mar. 2005
AN/TPY-2 is the world’€™s most advanced mobile radar, is a multi-function, X-band radar designed to search, acquire, track and discriminate threats from non-threats. It is a phased-array radar that delivers high-power output and exceptional beam/waveform agility. When employed in a forward-based mode, the AN/TPY-2 will detect a ballistic missile close to the country of origin. This is the role of the USA TPY-2 deployed in Turkey. The Forward-Based X-band Radar (FBX-T) tracks the object and its flight and reports the data to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. In the terminal mode, the AN/TPY-2 is part of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) integrated weapon system.

Land- and sea based sensors
SMART-L EWC: From 2018 onwards all four Royal Netherlands Navy Air Defense and Command Frigates (ADCF) will receive upgraded SMART-L radars with Early Warning Capability (EWC). Currently the Netherlands and Germany are investigating the possibility to co-operate on this project. This capability will enable these vessels to detect and track ballistic targets outside the earth’s atmosphere. Although these ships do not have a ballistic missile intercept capability, they can provide sensor information through data links (e.g. link 16) to other NATO ships and shore based air and missile defense installations that do possess this capability.
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Land- and sea based sensors
The first software batch to be incorporated into the SMART-L EWC will be tested in the spring of 2015 at an ‘€œAt Sea Demonstration’€ off the West coast of the United Kingdom.

Land- and sea based sensors
AN/SPY-1 Radar is the key component of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) manufactured by Lockheed Martin. The passive electronic scanning system is computer controlled, using four complementary antennas in order to provide full 360 degree coverage. It is a multi-function phased-array radar capable of search, automatic detection, transition to track, tracking of air and surface targets, and missile engagement support.

Land- and sea based sensors
The AN/TPS-77 is an L-band, phased-array radar and will be provided to the NATO architecture by Italy. The radar‒s planar array antenna rotates to provide 360 degree azimuth coverage. As the antenna rotates, the radar transmits pencil beams that are electronically phase scanned to provide complete elevation coverage. It has long-range detection performance, especially in weather and clutter. The TPS-77€™s pencil beam architecture allows the parameters of each beam to be tailored to its environment – greatly reducing the effects of terrain and weather clutter. A six degree ‘€œlookdown€’ capability also permits coverage in valley areas inaccessible to ‘€œstacked beam’€ radars.

Land- and sea based sensors
Future Capability: REW (Removable Early Warning Radar) France continues to study an Early Warning Capability, including exploratory studies about low frequency very long range BMD radar. Thales, in conjunction with ONERA is developing a new radar to relay space-based systems in order to provide accurate data through NATO C2 to cue multifunction or fire control radars dedicated to NATO BMD. A demonstrator with an antenna populated with one eighth the transmit/receive modules of the production REW UHF radar will be first produced and deployed for multipurpose testing.

Interceptor systems
Upper Layer Interceptors offer the NATO Commander the first opportunity to intercept hostile missiles. They can conduct intercepts outside and within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. NATO’s final line of defence is provided by lower layer interceptors. These interceptors are designed to destroy hostile ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere.

Interceptor systems
15 May. 2013
The Raytheon Standard Missile-3 provides a hit to kill upper layer defence capability. The SM-3 Missile is evolving and will provide even more significant defensive capability as enhancements become operational. The combination of naval ships and SM-3 Fulfils NATO’€™s territorial missile defence requirement. Maritime missile defence leverages existing investments in NATO’€™s most advanced naval ships. There are a number of ships in service today capable of employing SM-3, such as the US frigate AEGIS. They can provide territorial missile defence, while maintaining their multi-role capability.

Interceptor systems
SAMP/T is a land-based (and potentially sea-based) 360° air defence system incorporating the Aster 30 missile, designed to provide area defence and point defence for land forces and sensitive sites. The missile is effective against any emerging threats, including short-range ballistic missiles, aircraft, UAVs, helicopters and also the new generation of high-speed stealthy stand-off missiles.

Interceptor systems
Aster is a modular family of vertically launched air defence missiles, designed initially for naval use. France and Italy will modernize the Aster 30 missile (Block 1 New Technology version), the sensors and the Command and Control assets with increased capabilities giving the system the ability to engage up to medium range and manoeuvring ballistic missiles while maintaining its capability to destroy simultaneously any kind of air breathing threat.

Interceptor systems
10 Oct. 2012
The combat-proven Patriot is the world’s most advanced air and missile defence system. With over 200 fire units fielded worldwide, it is a system of choice for 12 nations around the globe, including the U.S. and four NATO nations.

Interceptor systems
01 Sep. 2014
Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) is a key element of the United States (US) Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) designed to defend US troops, allied forces, population centres, and critical infrastructure. THAAD operates in a unique battle space intercepting both endo- and exo-atmospheric short-to-intermediate range ballistic missiles. This ground-based missile defence system is rapidly deployable with high-mobility, providing proven capability to Combatant Commanders worldwide.

Interim NATO BMD and next steps
Interim NATO BMD Capability provides an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering the maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability.
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Interim NATO BMD and next steps
BMD Capable Aegis Ships Forward Deployed at Rota. The US navy is forward deploying four Aegis BMD capable ships to Rota, Spain. The USS Donald Cook arrived in Feb 2014 and will be followed by three other ships (the USS Ross, the USS Porter and the USS Carney), in summer 2014, spring 2015 and fall 2015, respectively. These multi-mission U.S. Navy ships will perform a myriad of tasks, including NATO BMD, the full spectrum of maritime security operations, bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises, and other non-BMD NATO operations and deployments. When warranted based on threat assessments and indications and warning, any of the 4 ships can be transferred to NATO command and control.

Interim NATO BMD and next steps
13 Feb. 2014
Following the groundbreaking ceremony in October 2013, construction started on the Aegis Ashore at the Deveselu Military Base in Romania, which will be operational in the 2015 timeframe. An additional Aegis Ashore will be operational in Poland in the 2018 timeframe. Enhanced interceptors and associated software will be deployed in 2015 timeframe (SM-3 IB) and the 2018 timeframe (SM-3 IIA).
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Command & control systems
04 May. 2007
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) for the United States Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) provides situational awareness, planning, and battle management capabilities.
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Command & control systems
NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is the world’€™s first fully integrated C2 system for planning, tasking and execution of air and missile defence operations. ACCS has been recently upgraded with BMD capabilities and deployed in BMD Command Centres. ACCS will continue to be upgraded with more robust BMD capabilities in several increments. It is the core of the current and future NATO BMD situational awareness and battle management capability. The ACCS has been developed by Thales Raytheon System (TRS).
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Command & control systems
18 Oct. 2005
The German Air Force uses a command and control system called SAMOC to plan and direct missile defence operations. It is linked to the NATO command and control system to conduct planning for Germany’€™s BMD assets.

Command & control systems
The Air Command and Control Information Service (AirC2IS), under development by ATOS, delivers NATO’€™s industrialized TBMD planning capability. This modern, extensible system is designed primarily for the NATO Joint Forces Commanders and their higher headquarters.

Potential future capabilities
19 Sep. 2013
A number of European Frigates already employ variants of the Standard missile and could be adapted to employ the SM-3 to provide territorial missile defence using a new version of the missile uplink, while maintaining the multirole capability of these ships.

Potential future capabilities
14 Nov. 2006
The SAMP-T, including the Aster shooter, still offers a comfortable growth potential to cope with threat evolution. The weapon system, developed jointly between MBDA and Thales, could maximize the protection of sensitive zones and deployed troops against more advanced short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and air breathing threats. In the naval sector Italy is also considering the potential upgrade of the systems towards a sea-based BMD capability.

Potential future capabilities
The Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) has initially been a tri-national (US, DEU, ITA) programme with the aim of developing a mobile air and missile defence system that is easily transportable, tactically mobile and uses the hit-to-kill PAC-3 MSE Missile to defeat tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft, providing full 360-degree engagement. MEADS is currently undergoing a demonstration phase which will mark the end of the design phase. Two successful Flight Tests (in 2012 and 2013) have demonstrated the maturity of MEADS components. Because it has no blind spots against the evolving threat and offers improved range, interoperability and mobility, MEADS has the potential to improve the capability to defend troops, friends and Allies in critical areas and potential theatres around the globe.

Potential future capabilities
27 May. 2009
GS1000 multifunction radar. Thales has developed an S-band technology platform called M3R for the French DGA, including an S-band active radar antenna demonstrator which was successfully tested in 2011. This demonstrator is used to develop the detailed requirements and essential technology of a future long range multifunction radar to provide lower-tier systems with a fully autonomous long-range detection/cueing and fire control capability against short to medium range ballistic missiles.

Potential future capabilities
Phantom Eye is a hydrogen fuelled, high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which will be capable of 7 days of endurance at 65,000 ft with 2,000 lbs of payload weight. It makes sensing from the stratosphere accessible and affordable with global reach from a single base. It can carry a variety of payloads, including communications and multiple sensor packages.

11 Apr. 2013
The Gap Filling Tracking Radar (GFTR-2100) from Weibel Scientific A/S, is a scalable Land & Sea Based Long Range High Accuracy Tracking Radar, capable of providing Fire Control Quality Data out to and beyond 2000 km.

Source: NATO

By

Leopold James De Rothschild

Senior Editor

NATO Section

News24.7WorldPress

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